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ABSTRACT
A PRIORI ARGUMENTS FOR REDUCTIONISM
SEPTEMBER 2003
JENNIFER R. SUSSE, B. A., MACALESTER COLLEGE
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Lynne Rudder Baker
Recently, several philosophers have argued that nonreductive physicalism
is a false, unstable, and incoherent position. I argue that the position these
critics are attacking is a straw one. To help explain why let us distinguish three
issues about which nonreductive physicalists might plausibly be thought to
have an opinion: i) ontological considerations about the types of things
that
exist at a world, ii) issues involving the existence and nature of any
dependency
relationships between the types of things that exist at a world, and m)
epistemological questions regarding the best way to describe, explain,
or
characterize the types of things that exist at a world. I argue
that reductive and
nonreductive physicalists essentially agree with respect to
the first two issues,
but disagree with respect to the last issue. Nonreductive
physicalists advocate a
position that is ontologically or metaphysically
reductive, but epistemologically
or representationally nonreductive. Although this
position could prove false on
empirical grounds, it is neither unstable nor
incoherent.
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CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Chapter One: The Commitment to Physicalism
In order to understand the position that nonreductive physicalists are
advocating, we first need to understand what they mean by physicalism. I tried
to come up with a definition that first, and foremost, would be acceptable to
both reductive and nonreductive physicalists; second, would exclude the views
of most self-professed non-physicalists; and, third, would not be false. I argue
that all physicalists should be committed to at least two theses: first, to the
thesis that every particular in space and/ or time is, or is composed out of,
fundamental physical particulars; and, second, to the thesis that any two non-
alien worlds that are physical duplicates are duplicates simpliciter. I also argue
that there is no particular epistemological claim that would be accepted by all
physicalists.
Chapter Two: A Historic Look at Nonreductive Physicalism
In the second chapter I try to clear up some of the terminological
confusion surrounding the debate over reductionism. I briefly discuss six
types
of reduction that philosophers have been interested in over the
years. I argue
that many of the recent criticisms of nonreductive physicalism fail
to attack
their target because they fail to understand the type of
reduction that
nonreductive physicalists are rejecting. I take that target to be
the classic, and
historically influential, nonreductive physicalist positions
of philosophers such
1
as Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Geoffrey Heilman and Frank
Thompson, and Richard Boyd. I closely examine the details of these classic
accounts in order to understand what nonreductive physicalists are, and are
not, claiming.
Chapter Three: The Multiple Realization Argument
In the third chapter I look at four challenges to the multiple realization
argument (an argument considered by many to be one of the main inspirations
for nonreductive physicalism). They are: i) the observation that many
respectable physical properties are just as multiply realized as are psychological
properties; ii) the argument that the multiple realization of special-scientific,
and psychological-kind, properties in disparate physical properties does not
rule out reductions to abstract-physical, or physical-functional, properties; iii)
the claim that local reductions (e.g., species-specific reductions) should be
reductions enough; and iv) the argument that if there are nomologically-
necessary biconditional connections between each mental-kind property
and a
complex physical property (perhaps one that is expressed by a disjunctive
predicate), then reductionism follows. I argue that although these
challenges do
succeed in showing the multiple realization argument to be unsound,
they do
not succeed in establishing reductionism. I am especially
concerned to show
that the last argument (known as the disjunctive move) does not establish
a type
of reductionism that threatens the core intuitions of
nonreductive physicalism.
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Chapter Four: Additional A priori Challenges to Nonreductive Physicalism
In the fourth chapter I consider three additional a priori arguments for
reductionism. I argue that these arguments either rely on suspect premises that
are not universally shared, or they miss their intended target (actual
nonreductive physicalist positions). The three arguments are as follows: 1) The
argument from causation against mental realism. This argument claims that if
mental events are token-identical, but not reducible, to physical events, then
given the causal completeness of physics, mental properties would be shown to
be causally inefficacious. If mental properties are shown to be causally
inefficacious, then mental realism would be shown to be false. 2) The argument
from physical composition for epistemological reductionism. This argument claims
that given a basic assumption of physicalism— that all particulars in space/ and
or time are either fundamental physical particulars, or are composed out of
fundamental physical particulars-a sort of epistemological reductionism
follows. Epistemological reduction follows because the properties and behavior
of each token-mental event would have some explanation in terms of its
physical
properties. 3) The Argument from Mysterious Connections.
This argument claims
that nonreductive physicalism is committed to the existence of
brute,
mysterious, and inexplicable connections between mental properties
and
physical properties. Reductive physicalism must be true, the
challenger asserts,
because only then we would be able to explain the existence of such
connections.
3
INTRODUCTION
In 1989 Jaegwon Kim began his Eastern APA meeting address, The Myth
of Nonreductive Materialism , by noting that, "Reductionism of all sorts has been
out of favor for many years." 1 Although Kim undoubtedly succeeded in
capturing the philosophical mood at the time, it would be difficult to make the
same claim today. Due in a large part to Kim's influence, the pendulum of
philosophical opinion has since swung back and reductionism is back in favor.
At least, psychophysical reductionism is back in favor. Philosophers who argue
for psychophysical reductionism fall roughly into two camps: those who are
sanguine about the prospects for an empirical reduction of psychology to neuro
or cognitive science, and those who argue that, given certain metaphysical
assumptions, psychophysical reductionism is true a priori. The first camp
includes the so-called New Wave Reductionists: John Bickle, D. H. M. Brooks,
Paul Churchland, Patricia Churchland, Berent Enq, C. A. Hooker, and Peter
Smith. 2 Philosophers falling into the second camp include Jaegwon Kim,
Brian
Loar, Robert Francescotti, and Andrew Melnyk.
3 To distinguish those who offer
a priori reasons in support of reductionism from the
empirically based approach
of the New Wavers, let us call the philosophers in the second camp A
Priori
Reductionists.4
I intend to defend what is essentially a negative thesis:
that the A Priori
Reductionists do not prove what they claim to prove. They
claim to prove that
the position held by nonreductive physicalists is
false, unstable, and incoherent.
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I argue that instead they prove only that straw versions of nonreductive
physicalism make no sense. I believe that the only types of psychophysical
reductionism that are provable a priori, given a prior commitment to
physicalism, are so weak as to be essentially indistinguishable from
nonreductive physicalism . 5 Nonreductive physicalists can accept these weak
forms of reductionism without compromising their commitment to irreducibility,
as they understand it . 6 Note that as this thesis is primarily negative, it is still
possible that there is some yet unexamined a priori argument that does prove
reductionism. I have a strong intuition that no such argument will be found, but
I will not be able to prove this positive claim here.
What is Reduction?
Although the terms reduction and reductionism are ubiquitous in
philosophical discourse, they are frequently left undefined and under-analyzed.
As a result, it is fairly common for philosophers to use these words equivocally,
and thus to talk past one another when discussing issues of reductionism. In
my second chapter, I will try to clear up some of this terminological confusion.
For now, let us look generally at what philosophers have taken reduction
to be.
Some philosophers define reduction in such a way that most physicalists
become reductive physicalists. For example, David Lewis writes
that he is a
reductionist because he holds, "As an a prion principle,
that every contingent
truth must be made true, somehow, by the pattern of coinstantiation
of
5
fundamental properties and relations ." 7 In other words, Lewis claims to be a
reductionist because he believes that the fundamental properties and relations at
a world determine the other contingent properties and relations at that world.
He claims to be a physicalist because he believes it likely that the fundamental
properties and relations at our world are, as a matter of contingent fact,
physical. The problem with this way of characterizing reductionism is that it
obviates the distinction between reductive and nonreductive varieties of
physicalism. As I will discuss in my first chapter, all physicalists believe that
the physical way things are at our world determines the way things are in other
respects.
Others assume that a reduction requires a much more stringent set of
conditions. Jerry Fodor, for example, thinks that psychology is reducible to
physics only if for each psychological-kind predicate we can identify a physical-
kind predicate that is nomologically correlated with it .
8 In other words, Fodor
believes that a reduction requires that the reduced and reducing theories be
mere terminological variants of each other. The problem with this
way of
characterizing reduction is that it sets the bar impossibly high. No generally
accepted example of intertheoretic reduction satisfies Fodor's
overly strict
requirements.
There are a couple of questions that need to be raised
at the outset of any
discussion of reductionism. The first is the question of
what exactly is, or is not,
being reduced. That is, what are the relata of a reduction
supposed to be? The
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second is the question of what type of relationship needs to be established (or to
hold) between these relata in order to count as a reduction. I will be primarily
concerned with the first question here. When I first started thinking about the
issue of reductionism, I distinguished between metaphysical reductionism and
epistemological reductionism. I now think that the issue is a little more
complicated than these two categories would suggest. Fortunately, at around
the time that I became dissatisfied with my initial distinction, I had the good
fortune to come across Robert Van Gulick's excellent overview of reductionism
in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 I now think that Van Gulick's distinction
is a little more useful for my purposes. Van Gulick distinguishes between
ontological reduction — which involves a relationship between real world items
(objects, events, or properties) — and representational reduction — which involves a
relationship between representational items (theories, concepts, or models).
Nonreductive physicalism, he tells us, "Typically combines a denial of some
form(s) of representational reduction with the acceptance of some type(s) of
ontological reduction supposedly adequate to secure its physicalist
credentials ." 10 I agree. It is my contention that philosophers who eschew
reductionism generally do so because they believe that we cannot now (or,
perhaps, cannot ever) explain a particular theory, phenomena, property,
or
domain in terms of a privileged other. This privileged other is usually
thought to
be physical theory, the physical domain, or physical
predicates. They deny that
such an explanation is available because they believe
that non-physical theories
7
(e.g., psychological and special-scientific theories), or non-physical predicates
(e.g., psychological and special-scientific predicates), do not neatly map to
physical theories and predicates. Reductive physicalists, on the other hand, are
those who believe that the theories and phenomena at these higher-levels are
ultimately explainable in terms of fundamental physics, albeit perhaps only an
ideal or future fundamental physics.
Ontological vs. Representational Reduction
As the different characterizations of reduction and reductionism over the
past 50 years makes clear (see Appendix), philosophers have traditionally
thought of reduction as a relationship between representational items. It is only
recently, as philosophy has made a metaphysical turn, that philosophers have
begun to speak of reduction as an ontological relationship as well. To
understand what nonreductive physicalists are advocating it is useful to go
back to the roots of the debate over reductionism. In the 1950s Kemeny and
Oppenheim defined reduction as, "A replacement of an accepted theory (or
body of theories) by a new theory (or body of theories) which is in some
sense
superior to it." 11 Kemeny and Oppenheim, then, considered the relata
of a
reduction to be theories and the relationship to be replacement.
At around the
same time, Ernest Nagel wrote that he considered a
reduction to be, "The
explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws
established in one area of
inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably
formulated for some other
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domain ." 12 Thus for Nagel as well the relata of a reduction are theories. In
short, reduction for both of these seminal thinkers is essentially intertheoretic
reduction — an explanation of one theory (or set of theories) by means of another
theory (or set of theories).
Each, though, has different requirements for intertheoretic reduction.
Whereas Kemeny and Oppenheim believe that a reduction between To (a
reducing theory) and Ti (a reduced theory) is effected whenever the
observations and facts explained by Ti are equally well explained by the more
powerful and better systemized To, Nagel (assuming the Deductive-
Nomological Account of Explanation) believes that a reduction between To and
Ti is effected only when the laws of Ti can be logically deduced from the laws of
To. Logical deduction is merely one of Nagel's formal requirements for
reduction, however. Nagel also offered the following non-formal requirements
for reduction: i) that the reduction should herald, "A significant advance in
the
organization of knowledge," and ii) that the reduction should be, "Fertile in
usable suggestions for developing the secondary science [TI]/
13
But it was the above-mentioned formal requirement that captured
philosophical imagination. Nagel observed that in order to satisfy
his formal
requirement one of two situations had to hold -either: 1) the
two theories
would have to employ the same theoretical vocabulary, or ii)
for cases in which
the theories employ different theoretical vocabulary,
there would need to be
some sort of connection between the terms of the two
theories. We cannot
9
formally deduce laws about the behavior of gases solely from the laws of
thermodynamics, as the gas laws contain terms like temperature that are not
found in the lower-level theory. For this reason, Nagel argued that reduction
(read deduction) of Ti to To is possible only if T0 is augmented by something he
called bridge laws or bridge connections between the disparate vocabulary of the
two theories. For some reason, this artifact of Nagel's theory became something
of an enshrined assumption in the debate over reductionism; and until fairly
recently it was common to assume that reductions involve bridge laws in some
respect.
I refer my reader back to the Appendix. As you can see from the quotes
included there, many of the philosophers writing about reductionism assume
that reductions require logical derivations and bridge laws. Examples include.
Hilary Putnam (1973), Jerry Fodor (1974), Heilman and Thompson (1975), Paul
Churchland (1979), Richard Boyd (1980), John Post (1987), David Owens (1989),
and Jaegwon Kim (1989). Furthermore, of those who do not explicitly claim that
reductions require bridge laws, many nevertheless assume that a reduction
is a
type of explanation (often a type of intertheoretic explanation).
For example,
Alan Garfinkel writes that psychology would be reduced to
physics and
chemistry only if, "Conduct can be explained wholly in terms
of physical and
chemical phenomena." 14 According to Robert Cummings,
"Reduction requires
that the true statements and one can make about a domain in
a vocabulary v
can all be formulated in a different vocabulary v’."
15 David Owens writes that,
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"According to the reductionist, there is nothing of explanatory importance, no
laws or nomologically interesting classifications of events which cannot be
formulated in the language of physics." And Harold Kincaid claims that, "One
theory reduced to another when it can do all the explanatory work of the
reducing theory ." 16 For these philosophers as well, then, reduction is a type of
explanation.
Notice that all the above-mentioned philosophers consider the relata of a
reduction to be theories, explanations, or concepts .17 Even those philosophers
who see reduction as an ontological relationship between objects, events, or
properties assume that there would have to be some epistemological/
representational dimension for the relationship to count as a genuine reduction.
C. A. Hooker, for example, claims that the aims of reduction are "ontological
and explanatory unification ." 18 Paul and Patricia Churchland write that a
reduction should connect "two conceptual frameworks" as well as two
"domains". 19 And Terence Horgan, the only philosopher quoted in the
Appendix who explicitly assumes an ontological reading of reduction (reduction
is a relationship between properties), suggests that reductions
have
epistemological import because higher-order properties are connected
with
lower-order causal/ explanatory properties .
20 Even Kim, who has recently
characterized reduction as an ontological relationship
between properties or
phenomena, motivates his account with the claim that it will
help explain why
certain metaphysical relationships should hold.
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Ontological Reduction Does Not
Entail Representational Reduction
Many philosophers believe that, given the plausibility of ontological
reduction, it should theoretically be possible to effect a representational
reduction. Suppose we grant that it is theoretically possible to establish bridge
connections between mental properties and complex physical properties (i.e., not
the type of properties represented by physical-kind terms). Is the possibility of
this type of property connection sufficient to establish representational
reduction? Some reasons we might think it is not:
• We might have a problem with reducing mental properties to disjuncts of
physical properties. Intertheoretic reductions reduce the laws of one
theory to the laws of another theory, but we do not usually find
disjunctive properties in laws . 21 And even if we cio not have a problem
with disjunctive properties per se, we might have a problem with wildly
gerrymandered disjunctive properties.
• We might have a problem with infinite disjunctions. Suppose that the
properties picked out by predicates in a language L strongly superv ene
on the properties picked out by predicates in a language L. Given the
possibility of infinite realization, every n-adic predicate of L'
would be
equivalent to an open formula of an infinitary extension of L.
However,
if the disjuncts really are infinite, we might never be able to
translate L
into L, as the set of disjuncts employed in the definition would
not be
recursively enumerable. Any translation would be humanly
incomprehensible . 22
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• We might have certain practical standards for representational
reduction. For example, we might understand reduction to mean an
intertheoretic reduction that we (or some scientist) can understand. We
might believe that if no one ever has, or ever will, explain psychological
theories in physical terms then we would not have a genuine
explanation, and thus would not have true representational reduction.
• We might believe that the physical properties that realize mental
properties are what Sydney Shoemaker calls total realizers.23 The total
realizer of a mental property M includes the core realizer of M (some
intrinsic physical feature of a person, perhaps a brain state), along with
the physical inputs and outputs to that person or person's brain. We
might believe that there can be no true representational reduction if the
total realizing property fails to be taxonomic at the level of any purely
physical theory.
Conclusion
It is important to remember that the debate over psychophysical
reductionism in the philosophy of mind began as a debate about whether
psychology is inter-theoretically reducible to some physical science.
Interestingly, the assumptions that were originally made in the context of that
debate — e.g., that bridge laws are necessary, or necessary
and sufficient, for
reduction -still shape the way we think about reductionism today.
In the 1950s
many philosophers assumed that bridge laws were required
for inter-theoretic
reductions because they were committed to Ernest Nagel's
positivist account of
explanatory adequacy (the deductive-nomological [D-N]
account of
13
explanation). Now that most contemporary philosophers are no longer
committed to Nagel's account of scientific explanation, we have at least a prima
facie reason for reconsidering our assumption that bridge laws are central to the
debate over reductionism. I believe that the focus on bridge laws is something
of a historical accident and that bridge laws are neither necessary nor sufficient
for reduction. Ultimately, I agree with the New Waver's claim that the truth or
falsity of nonreductive physicalism is an empirical question to be determined
on the basis of future scientific work. In other words, the truth or falsity of
psychophysical reductionism cannot be established on a priori grounds.
14
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CHAPTER 1
THE COMMITMENT TO PHYSICALISM
Despite widespread popularity in the 60s, 70s, and 80s, nonreductive
physicalism has fallen from favor in recent years. 1 The general consensus
among its latest detractors is that nonreductive physicalism is a false, unstable,
and incoherent view. Although it may sound plausible when presented in
vague generalities, anyone who tries to formulate more precise position runs
into problems — either they end up committed to absurd theses, or their view
collapses into reductionism. 2 I intend to show that several historically
important nonreductive physicalist positions avoid both horns of this dilemma.
Later, in Chapter Two, I will argue that nonreductive physicalists can admit
some types of reductionism, specifically the types I will call ontological
reductionism and metaphysical reductionism, without compromising the core of
their anti-reductionist intuitions.
The first thing to note about nonreductive physicalism is that its
defenders are committed to physicalism. Although surely this point is obvious,
it is worth belaboring because of the recent attention paid to arguments for the
irreducibility of qualitative phenomenal experience. 3 If philosophers like Frank
Jackson and David Chalmers are right that qualia are neither grounded in, nor
determined by, anything physical, they will have proven irreducibility only at
the expense of physicalism. To tackle these arguments as well would needlessly
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complicate my thesis. Instead my primary concern will be to defend the
coherence of positions committed both to irreducibility and physicalism.
Before I get down to the main business of defending nonreductive
physicalism from the charge that it is a false, unstable, and incoherent position,
it would be useful to spell out to which theses nonreductive physicalists are
supposed to be committed. I propose that we first look at what it means for
someone to be committed to physicalism, before we explore the more difficult
question of what it means for someone to be committed to a nonreductive
version of physicalism. This second exploration will take place in Chapter Two.
Defining Physicalism
There are a number of desiderata that any definition of physicalism must
meet. First, it must be a definition that most self-professed physicalists would
recognize and identify with. Second, the definition should exclude the views of
most self-professed non-physicalists- furthermore, it should exclude
not only
Cartesian substance dualism, but also the views of someone like David
Chalmers. And third, it should pick out a position that is neither obviously nor
subtly false. As we will soon see, satisfying all three desiderata
will not be easy.
Let me try to tackle the first requirement by noting that there
are several
commitments shared by all physicalists. I will start with the least
controversial
of these commitments: the ontological commitment. I take it
to be fairly
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uncontroversial that a physicalist must assent to something like the following
claim:
(OC) All particulars (objects, events, and processes) in space and/ or time are
either fundamental physical particulars, or are exhaustively composed
out of fundamental physical particulars .4
There are a few things to note about (OC). Note, first, that (OC) does not claim
that everything that exists simpliciter either is, or is composed out of,
fundamental physical particulars. What exists is a deep and interesting
problem, but by most accounts there are things that exist that are not physical.
Numbers, propositions, algorithms, and properties, for example, are thought by
many to have real existence, despite their failure to be constructed out of
physical stuff .6 Second, it is important to realize that (OC) is insufficient b\
itself to define physicalism. Although (OC) clearly rules out the existence of
Driesch's entelechies and Cartesian souls, it does not yet exclude Chalmer's
qualia. If there are Cartesian souls, then there are particulars located in
time
that are neither fundamentally physical, nor composed out of anything
that is
fundamentally physical. On the other hand, (OC) is fully compatible with
Chalmer's claim that there exist non-physical facts and properties that
do not
depend, in any way, on the existence of fundamental physical
facts and
properties .6 (We will discuss what it means for something to be a fundamental
physical property shortly.)
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So although it is clear that a physicalist must be committed to (OC), it is
also clear that in advocating (OC) the physicalist has not yet established her
physicalist credentials. What is missing from (OC) is any statement to the effect
that the non-physical objects, events, and properties at a world depend on the
fundamental physical properties that exist there. To truly capture physicalism,
then, we will also need some sort of dependency claim. At minimum, a
physicalist needs to say that objects, events, and individuals at a world have
their non-physical properties because of, or in virtue of, the instantiation of the
fundamental physical properties at that world.
Notice that I have not yet said anything about the nature of this because
of, or in virtue of relation, or about how such a relation may obtain. I have only
asserted that physicalists must believe that the non-physical depends on the
physical in some way. In the second half of this chapter I will discuss whether
supervenience theses are able to capture the type of dependency relationship to
which a physicalist should commit. For now, it is enough to note that any
adequate formulation of physicalism should include some sort of dependency
claim. Without any sort of dependency claim, we would fail to satisfy our
second requirement of excluding most self-professed non-physicalists
positions.
Defining "Physical"
Whether a formulation of physicalism satisfies our last desideratum
(of
picking out a position that is neither obviously nor subtly
false) hinges on the
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definition of physical. Remember that (OC) is the claim that every particular that
exists in space and/ or time is either a fundamental physical particular, or is
composed out of fundamental physical particulars. Given this claim, it would
be nice to know what makes something a fundamental physical particular.
Geoffrey Heilman spells out just what is at stake in finding the right definition
of physical.
Current physics is surely incomplete (even in its ontology) as well as
inaccurate (in its laws). This poses a dilemma: either physicalists
principles are based on current physics, in which case there is every
reason to think they are false; or else they are not, in which case it is, at
best, difficult to interpret them, since they are based on a "physics" that
does not exist -yet we lack any general criterion of "physical object,
property, or law" framed independently of existing physical theory .
7
Perhaps being a fundamental physical particular is just being a particular that
instantiates a single fundamental physical property. But if so, we still need to
know what counts as a fundamental physical property. One possibility is that a
fundamental physical property is any property recognized by current theories
of fundamental physics. A competing possibility is that it is any property that
some ideal future theory of fundamental physics will come to recognize
.
8 These
are very different claims! The first claim is obviously false, the second
problematic and more subtly false.
If fundamental physical particulars are those particulars that
instantiate
the fundamental physical properties recognized by current
fundamental
physical theory, then the thesis that all particulars are, or
are composed out of.
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fundamental physical particulars is patently false. It is patently false because
current physical theories are: a) bound to change and evolve, and b) currently
contradictory. However, if fundamental physical properties are whatever
properties some ideal future theory of fundamental physics will come to
recognize, then the claim that every particular is either a fundamental physical
particular, or is composed out of fundamental physical particulars, is
problematic for subtler reasons. The problem is that it is entirely possible that
future physical theory will consider things that intuitively we would not count
as physical — such as qualia or psychic phenomena— to be fundamental features
of our world. Such a possibility makes the second characterization of
fundamental physical property/particular inadequate for our needs. Were future
physical theory to count qualia or psychic phenomena as fundamental features
of our world, we would want physicalism to have thereby been falsified.
However, according to the second definition of findatnentally physical
property/particular, physicalism would not have been falsified.
Our best hope for an adequate definition of physical is, unfortunately,
somewhat unsatisfying. We should insist that a fundamental physical property
is whatever property some ideal future theory of fundamental
physics comes to
recognize, provided that the property is similar enough to the properties
that
current fundamental physics recognizes. Yes this definition is
vague; yes it is
hand waving; but it might still be the best we can hope to do .
9 At least we can
take solace in the fact that we do seem to have some intuitive
sense of what
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should count as a physical property, as witnessed by our confidence that were
the fundamental features of the universe to include qualia and psychic
phenomena we would want such a discovery to falsify physicalism.
Supervenience
So far all I have said about the dependency claim is that there should be
one. That is, that anyone who is a physicalist has to believe that objects, events,
and individuals at our world have their non-physical properties because of, or in
virtue of the instantiation of the fundamental physical properties at that world.
However, we still need to flesh out this dependency claim with some more
substantive thesis. It is now common to try to capture dependency claims with
supervenience theses. But supervenience theses have been criticized in recent
years for failing to capture genuine dependence. I argue that while most
supervenience theses do a poor job at capturing dependency claims, some are
better than others. In the end, I believe that most physicalists should be able to
commit to a version of global supervenience that quantifies only over non-alien
worlds. (I explain what these are below.)
In order to understand why supervenience theses are often thought to be
inadequate to capture the kind of dependence or determination
relationship we
think holds e.g., between the mental and the physical, we will
need to look at
the various formulations of supervenience separately.
Let us look first at weak
supervenience, then strong, and then global.
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Weak Supervenience
There are two ways that weak supervenience theses are usually
formulated. Let A and B be families of properties, and x and y range over
particulars.
(I) A weakly supervenes on B iff necessarily for any x and y, if x and y share
all their B-properties, then x and y share all their A-properties.
(II) A weakly supervenes on B iff necessarily for any property F in A, if an
object x has F, then there exists a property G in B, such that x has G, and
if any y has G it has F. D[VFe A, Vx (Fx —
>
3GeB [Gx & Vy (Gy —» Fy)])] 10
(I) says that any two objects at a world that are identical with respect to their
subvenient properties (the B-properties) should be identical with respect to
their supervenient properties (the A-properties) as well. Suppose that we have a
weak supervenience relationship that holds between a subvenient-family of
physical properties and a supervenient-family of moral properties. Given such
a relationship, any two physical duplicates at our world should be morally
duplicates as well. So if Mother Theresa was a good person, any physical
duplicate of Mother Theresa at our world would also be a good person.
11
(II) is trickier than (I), as in order to make sense of (II) we have to make
some controversial assumptions about the nature of property
formation. We
have to assume that any time an object has a supervenient property,
there is
some specific subvenient property also had by that object that
materially
implies that supervenient property. Thus (II) is plausible only
if we assume that
complex Boolean combinations of properties also count as
properties. If we
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instead insist that only the so called natural properties (properties in which the
objects having them resemble one another in some intrinsic respect) deserve to
be called 'properties' then (II) will likely turn out false— as it is unlikely that for
every non-physical property M there is some natural -physical property that
materially implies M. The problem is not with conjunctive or structural
properties, which are plausibly considered natural, but with disjunctive
properties. If non-physical properties (e.g., biological, psychological, and
economic properties) are generally multiply realized in disparate physical
properties, then the physical property on which the non-physical property
supervenes will be disjunctive . 12
Even if we admit more than just the natural properties in the subvening
base, we still might want to restrict the type of Boolean operators that are
permissible in property construction when the subvenient properties are
physical properties. ^ For example, we might want to exclude negation from
our list of acceptable operators on physical properties. As John Post points out,
were we to say that physical properties are closed under complementation, we
would be forced to accept the unusual and absurd result that the property of
"not being a physical property" is a physical property on which non-physical
properties might legitimately supervene . 14
However, the main problem with both versions of weak supervenience
is
that the relationship of dependence they pick out is very odd.
Note that weak
supervenience theses do more than just establish intra-world
relationships
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between properties. Weak supervenience theses have modal import as well, as
they hold that at every world in the domain of quantification there is a
relationship of material implication between the subvenient properties and
supervenient properties. The odd part is that they fail to insist that the same
relationships hold across worlds. (Note that I am counting a relationship as
different if and only if it is possible for the same set of subvening properties to be
related to a different set of supervening properties.) Weak supervenience claims
are inadequate for the physicalist's purposes, as it is consistent with weak
supervenience claims that whereas at this world human beings with complex
brains are always conscious, at some other possible world human beings with
equally complex brains are never conscious. Because they allow the relationship
between the subvenient properties and the supervenient properties to vary in
this way across worlds, weak supervenience theses fail to capture a type of
dependence relationship that is appropriate for defining physicalism.
Strong Supervenience
Let us now turn our attention to strong supervenience theses. As with
the weak supervenience relationship, there are typically two ways of
formulating strong supervenience. They are:
(III) For any worlds, wj and wk, and for any objects, x and y, if x in wj has the
same B-properties that y has in wk, then in wj, x has the same A-
properties that y has in wk.
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(IV) A strongly supervenes on B just in case, necessarily, for each x and each
property F in A, if x has F, then there exists a property G in B such that x
has G and necessarily if any y has G, it has F. D[VFe A, Vx (Fx -> 3GeB
[Gx & Vy (Gy -> Fy)])]
The possible worlds formulation of strong supervenience, (III), claims that the
family of A-properties strongly supervenes on the family of B-properties just in
case it cannot be the case that objects with the same B-properties fail to have the
same A-properties. That is, cross-world indiscernibility in B entails cross-world
indiscernibility in A. The modal formulation of strong supervenience, (IV),
again tries to capture the intuition that the supervening properties depend for
their existence on the subvening properties that necessitate them. (IV) has the
same problems with property formation as (II) did, but we will put aside those
worries for now. The main advantage that strong supervenience has over weak
supervenience is due to the extra necessity operator inside the third set of
parentheses in (IV). It is this extra necessity operator that ensures that the
dependency relationships that hold at one world will hold at all worlds. In
other words, this extra necessity operator ensures that the same subvening
properties correlate with the same supervening properties across worlds. It is
also this same extra necessity operator, however, that creates new problems for
those who wish to use supervenience theses to capture dependency
relationships. We will discuss these problems shortly when we look at John
Hawthorne's criticisms of global supervenience theses below.
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Before we begin our discussion of the putative problems that even strong
supervenience theses have capturing dependence relationships, let us note a
few things about the above formulations of strong supervenience. Note, first,
that strong supervenience theses require that both the supervenient properties
and the subvenient properties be instantiated by the same individual. This
requirement raises an obvious concern. If the supervenient properties are
higher-order non-physical properties (like the property of being a philosophy
department, or of thinking about one's recent visit to see friends in Frankfurt),
and the subvenient properties are lower-order intrinsic physical properties, then
the claim that the supervening properties strongly supervene on the subvening
properties will be false. An individual's higher-order properties often depend
for their instantiation on a combination of the intrinsic physical properties of
that individual, along with a wide range of lower-order properties and relations
involving various other individuals. This worry about strong supervenience's
co-instantiation requirement is one of the primary reasons for the popularity of
global supervenience theses. (More on this point and on global supervenience
claims shortly.)
The second thing to note about strong supervenience theses is that the
necessity operators in the modal operator formulations can have different
interpretations, depending on the specific relationship one is trying to capture.
Philosophers who want to use a strong supervenience thesis to capture the
relationship they think holds between functionally defined states and the
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occupants or realizers of those states often interpret the second modal operator
as mere physical or nomological necessity, rather than the stronger case of
metaphysical or logical necessity. This is because functional states are defined
extrinsically by reference to their typical causes and effects. In other words,
whether a physical state P qualifies as the realizer or occupant of a particular
mental state M depends essentially on P's nomological relations to other states
and events in a world/ system. On the other hand, philosophers who want to
capture a mereological relationship, or a relationship between determinates and
determinables, often interpret the second modal operator strongly, as
metaphysical or logical necessity.15
Let us now turn our attention to the criticism that even strong
supervenience theses fail to capture genuine property dependence. There are
two problems that Thomas Grimes and Jaegwon Kim (post 1990) claim beset
anyone who tries to use even a strong supervenience thesis to capture a
dependency relationship. 16 They are: i) the fact that supervenience theses are
usually formulated in terms of property covariance leaves open the possibility
that the two families of properties covary without either being dependent on
the other; and ii) the fact that most supervenience theses are reflexive and
nonsymmetric means that supervenience theses are poor vehicles for capturing
a dependency relationship that, by most accounts, is irreflexive and
asymmetric.
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Let us look at the criticism expressed by (i) first. Grimes and Kim claim
that even strong supervenience theses leave open the possibility that A and B
might covary without either being dependent on the other. This might happen
were the covariance relationship to hold only because each is dependent on a
third set of properties -C-properties, for example
.
17 To illustrate this problem,
Kim offers the fictional (?) example of a correlation between high IQ scores and
a high degree of manual dexterity. Presumably the reason IQ scores and
manual dexterity covary is not because one is dependent on the other, but
because each depends on a third set of properties (whatever properties capture
the appropriate genetic and developmental factors responsible for each trait).
Here is another example I thought of. The Wiedmann-Franz Law tells us that
the degree of electrical conductivity of a piece of metal is correlated with its
thermal conductivity (and vice-versa). In other words, thermal conductivity
and electrical conductivity perfectly covary with each other at any world in
which the law holds. Yet clearly neither type of conductivity is dependent on
the other. Presumably what explains the amazing fact of their covariance is the
existence of a third set of properties (the micro-structural properties of the
metals involved).
These two examples are supposed to show that even strong
supervenience theses are not strong enough to ensure real dependence, as
strong supervenience theses express only a relationship of strong covariance
between properties, and it is possible to have a relationship of strong
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covariance between properties without having a relationship of real
dependence. But before we accept this result, let us look closer at the above
examples. We should note that both examples are of cases in which there is a
relationship of strong covariance, without a corresponding dependence
relationship, only if the first necessity operator in (IV) represents mere physical
or nomological necessity, rather than the stronger cases of metaphysical or
logical necessity. It is nomologically necessary (we will assume) that
intelligence covaries with manual dexterity, and it is nomologically necessary
that thermal conductivity covaries with electrical conductivity, but it is
certainly not logically or metaphysically necessary that there be such
relationships. If it really is the case that manual dexterity does not depend on
intelligence, and thermal conductivity does not depend on electrical
conductivity, and vice-versa, then there is probably not going to be a
metaphysically necessary strong covariance relationship between them. If there
were a metaphysically necessary strong covariance relationship between them,
then we would probably say that (surprisingly) there is real dependence .
18 To
conclude, it seems that this criticism has less bite to it than it originally
appeared to have, as anyone who hopes to use a strong supervenience
relationship to capture real dependence should probably interpret the first modal
operator fairly strongly — most likely as metaphysical necessity .
19 If the first
modal operator is interpreted strongly enough, then we should be able to
rule
out examples of asymmetrical nomological covariance .
20
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Another problem for typical formulations of strong supervenience is
captured by the second criticism. We usually think of dependency relationships
as asymmetric — that is, we think that if G determines F, then it cannot also be
the case that F determines G. As typically written, however, strong
supervenience theses fail to ensure an irreflexive and asymmetric relationship.
The following example illustrates this problem: The distance traversed by a
moving car is a function of the rate/ speed at which the car is traveling and the
time it takes to get to its destination. Suppose we are trying to determine the
relationship between the speed at which a car travels a certain stretch of
highway and the time it takes to complete this stretch. After careful
investigation we discover that when two cars travel at identical speeds over the
same distance their time is identical. Furthermore, when two cars travel the
same distance in identical lengths of time their speed is identical. A little
mathematical investigation convinces us that this was no fluke. Given the same
stretch of highway, speed and time strongly covary with one another in the
sense given by (III) and (IV). However, the relationship is not an asymmetric
one, as dependency relationships usually are. It is symmetric! And the fact that
it is symmetric clearly indicates to us that this is not a relationship of
dependence.
But perhaps there is some clause we could add to strong supervenience
theses to ensure that the relationship is asymmetric - for example,
we might
want to say that although the B-properties supervene on the
A-properties, the
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reverse does not hold. Or perhaps, as Peter Menzies has advocated, we will
need to add different clauses for each type of relationship the supervenience
thesis attempts to capture— be it a logical relationship, a relationship between
determinates and determinables, a functional relationship between the
occupants of causal roles, or a mereological relationship. 21 At any rate, there is
at least a primn facie problem with the usual formulations of supervenience. I
think the problem can be mended by adding something like the above-
mentioned clause. (Grimes and Kim reject this proposal, but the reason they
give for their rejection rests on the criticism given in (i) — that it is possible for A
and B to covary only because each is dependent on C — and we have shown that
this criticism has much less bite to it than Grimes and Kim assume.)
However, there is yet a further problem with strong supervenience
theses. This is the problem I hinted at earlier when I pointed out that strong
supervenience theses require the two sets of properties to be co-instantiated by
the same individual. The problem is that, as written, they say nothing about the
nature of the properties that are included in the subvenient base. If the
subvenient base includes merely the intrinsic physical properties of the
supervenient object, then strong supervenience theses are probably false, as
objects possess a multitude of higher-level properties that depend on factors
that are extrinsic to them. For example, whether you possess the
property of
watching a beautiful sunset at 6 PM depends on: i) whether you are in the
presence of a sunset, ii) whether it is indeed 6 PM, and iii) whether
that sunset
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is beautiful (furthermore, according to some accounts, beauty depends on
external social standards). If the subvenient base properties include extrinsic
properties, however, and there is no principled way to limit which extrinsic
properties are included and which are excluded, then strong supervenience
theses have the potential to collapse into global supervenience theses. Note that
this result should not surprise us, given that many believe that strong
supervenience and global supervenience theses entail analogous dependence
relations . 22 If they do entail analogous dependence relations, then strong
supervenience theses should be appropriate for our needs only if global
supervenience theses are also appropriate for our needs. Without further ado,
then, let us turn to our attention the question of whether global supervenience
theses are appropriate for our needs; that is, to the question of whether they
satisfy the physicalist's desiderata.
Global Supervenience
Because of the apparent problem that strong supervenience theses have
accounting for cases in which the supervenient properties are determined
partly by extrinsic factors, many philosophers have looked to global
supervenience theses to capture the physicalist commitment. They have
assumed that global supervenience theses could satisfy the physicalist s
intuition that there is some kind of dependence relationship between
the
physical and non-physical features of a world without requiring an
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unnecessarily strong account of this relationship. This assumption has been
undermined in recent years, however, as global supervenience theses have been
criticized for failing to capture even the minimal physicalist commitment.
Before we see whether these criticisms hold up under analysis, let us first
briefly define global supervenience as follows:
(V) Worlds that are B-indiscernible are also A-indiscernible.
Note that (V) says nothing about how particular objects' supervenient
properties depend on their subvenient properties; its claim is only about the
relationship that holds globally between all the supervenient and subvenient
properties distributed over a world. Because we are primarily concerned with
the relationship that holds between the physical and the non-physical
properties at a world, let us speak not of (V) but of the following specific claim:
(PIGS) Worlds that are physically indiscernible are otherwise indiscernible.
There are two main criticisms that are typically made about global
supervenience theses like (PIGS). Each criticism attempts to show that the thesis
is too weak to capture even a minimal physicalist commitment. Briefly, the
two
criticisms are as follows: i) Kim's criticism (inspired by Bradford
Petrie) that
global supervenience theses cannot rule out the possibility
that a world
differing from our world in some seemingly insignificant
physical respect
might, nevertheless, wildly differ from our world in some
significant non-
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physical respect,23 and ii) the criticism that global supervenience theses like
(PIGS) are false, due to the metaphysical possibility that worlds physically
identical to our world might e.g., contain additional non-physical angels or
ectoplasmic stuff.
In 1987 Bradford Petrie argued that global supervenience theses like
(PIGS) are too weak to rule out the following scenario. Suppose there is a set of
worlds, wi and W2, each containing two objects, a and b, and two properties,
supervenient-property F and subvenient-property G. Petrie claims that the
following distribution of properties is consistent with global supervenience
theses.
Wl W2
Fa ~Fb
Ga Gb
~Fa ~Fb
Ga ~Gb
Petrie argues that this world-pair shows that global supervenience theses do
not entail strong supervenience theses. The distribution of properties in wi
and
W2 is not consistent with strong supervenience theses, as in each of these worlds
the fact that an object possesses or lacks G is irrelevant to whether or not it
possesses or lacks F. Petrie, however, claims this world-pair is
consistent with
global supervenience. As the two worlds are distinguishable
in the distribution
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of their base-level properties, they are allowed to be distinguishable in the
distribution of their supervenient-level properties as well.
Kim argues that Petrie's example shows that global supervenience theses
like (PIGS) are too weak to capture even a minimal physicalist commitment . 24
Suppose G is a physical property and F is a mental property. Physicalists
believe that the distribution of physical properties determines the distribution
of mental properties, but in these two worlds the fact that an object has physical
property G seems irrelevant to whether it has or lacks mental property F. Kim
extends Petrie's argument with the following analogy. He argues that claims
like (PIGS) are consistent with the possibility that there is a world
indistinguishable from our world physically, save the addition of an extra
ammonia molecule in one of Saturn's rings, that is as different from our world
in other respects as you please. Such a world might even lack consciousness
entirely. Here is what Kim says about the example:
Before we accept global psychophysical supervenience as a significant
form of materialism we should consider this: It is consistent with this
version of materialism for there to be a world which differs physically
from this world in some most trifling respect (say, Saturn's rings in that
world contain one more ammonia molecule) but which is entirely
devoid of consciousness, or has a radically different, perhaps totally
irregular, distribution of mental characteristics over its inhabitants
say,
creatures with brains have no mentality while rocks are conscious). As
long as that world differs from this one in some physical respect,
however, miniscule or seemingly irrelevant, it could be as different
as
you please in any psychological respect you choose .
25
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Remember that (PIGS) only claims that worlds with the same distribution of
physical properties have the same distribution of all other properties.
According to (PIGS), then, any set of physically indiscernible worlds should be
mentally indiscernible as well. But, by hypothesis, the two worlds under
consideration are not physically indiscernible, as one of the worlds contains one
more ammonia molecule than the other. Kim and Petrie are merely pointing out
that when the antecedent of a true conditional is false, the consequent can be
false as well.
But perhaps this criticism is a bit of a red herring. As John Heil argues, in
Chapter Three of The Nature of True Minds, although Petrie's world-pairs may
be logically consistent with (PIGS), we have reason to doubt that they are
metaphysically consistent with (PIGS). 26 Remember that what worlds there are
is a matter of necessity, not stipulation. If wi and W2 are metaphysically
possible, and you make the plausible assumption that intrinsic properties can
be redistributed in any combination, the following world should also be
metaphysically possible. 27
W3
~Fa ~Fb
Ga Gb
39
The metaphysical possibility of W3 shows that at least one of the original pair of
worlds is not consistent with (PIGS) after all. Global supervenience theses like
(PIGS) are supposed to range over all possible worlds. It cannot be the case that,
consistent with (PIGS), both W2 and W3 are metaphysical possibilities, as then
there would be a pair of worlds indistinguishable in their subvenient properties
but distinguishable in their supervenient properties. Thus it is not clear that
global supervenience theses allow for the sort of disconnect between base and
supervenient properties that would threaten physicalism, as Petrie and Kim's
examples had initially suggested.
Cranston Pauli and Ted Sider raise a similar criticism of Kim's example
in their paper, "In Defense of Global Supervenience." 28 They point out that if
the extra ammonia molecule world is metaphysically possible, then again by
the assumption that it is possible to redistribute intrinsic properties in any
combination, there should be a world physically identical to that world without
the extra ammonia molecule. In fact, our world is such a world! Does this woild
contain consciousness or not? If not, then the extra-ammonia-molecule world is
not consistent with (PIGS), because then there would be two worlds that are
indiscernible with respect to their physical properties (our world and this
world), but discernible with respect to their mental properties. However,
if this
world does contain consciousness, then the metaphysical possibility
of the
extra-ammonia-molecule world would show only that mental properties have a
very bizarre relationship to physical properties. It would turn out
that ammonia
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molecules have a surprisingly "all-pervasive influence". In short, either the
world that Kim describes is metaphysically impossible, because consciousness
depends on physical properties in some more substantial way, or (surprisingly)
ammonia molecules make more of a difference than we originally thought. In
either case, the claim that mental properties depend on physical properties is
left intact. Sider and Paul think physicalists should opt for their first horn, "No
self respecting materialists should admit that mental properties are like that
[dependent on extra ammonia molecules]. She should opt for the first horn of
the dilemma, and claim that the case is simply impossible ." 29 I agree. The
appropriate physicalists response to Kim's extra-ammonia-molecule scenario is
simple to deny that such a world is metaphysical possible. In conclusion, theses
like (PIGS) can escape Kim and Petrie's criticism, and may be what we need for
physicalism.
Possessor and Blocker Worlds
Unfortunately, there is a potentially more serious criticism of theses like
(PIGS) — the criticism that they are false. If (PIGS) is making a claim about all
logically or metaphysically possible worlds, then we have the following
problem. According to many philosophers it is metaphysically possible for
there to be a world physically indiscernible to our world, but otherwise
discernible, due to the existence of extra non-physical entities there. For
example, it might be metaphysically possible that there is a world, w*.
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physically just like our world, but metaphysically richer, because in addition to
all the stuff that our world contains, w* also contains non-physical angels .30 Let
us suppose that these non-physical angels manifest mental properties without
having to interact with the physical world in any way (perhaps they merely
hover about contemplating the goings-on at their world). In a recent paper,
John Hawthorne calls such entities possessors . 31 Extending Hawthorne's
terminology, let us call such worlds possessor-worlds. The problem with
possessor-worlds is that their existence makes (PIGS) false, as possessor-worlds
could be physical duplicates of our world without being duplicates simpliciter of
our world .32
One way to respond to this problem -that the metaphysical possibility
of possessors makes unrestricted global supervenience theses false— is to
restrict the domain of worlds being quantified over. For example, we might
restrict the domain to only minimal physical duplicates of our world, following
Frank Jackson's suggestion, or to only worlds in which no non-alien properties
are instantiated, following David Lewis s suggestion. (An alien property is, A
natural property that is not instantiated by any individual in [the actual world],
and is not analyzable as a conjunctive or structural property built up from
constituent that are all instantiated by parts of this world ).
33 Let us considei
Jackson's suggestion first. Jackson suggests the following emended global
supervenience thesis:
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(MDGS) Any world that is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a
duplicate simpliciter of our world.
A minimal physical duplicate of our world, according to Frank Jackson, is a
world that contains all the physical stuff that our world contains, and in the
exact same arrangement, without anything extra . 34 Here is how Jackson
explains the concept of a minimal physical duplicate:
What is a minimal physical duplicate? Think of a recipe for making
scones. It tells you what to do, but not what not to do. It tells you to add
butter to the flour but does not tell you not to add dirt to the flour. Why
doesn't it? Part of the reason is that no-one would think to add dirt
unless explicitly told to. But part of the reason is logical. It is impossible
to list all the things not to do. There are indefinitely many of them: don't
add bats wings; don't add sea water; don't add... Of necessity the
writers of recipes rely on an intuitive understanding of an implicitly
included 'stop' clause in their recipes. A minimal physical duplicate of
our world is what you would get if you — or God, as it is sometimes
put— used the physical nature of our world (including of course its
physical laws) as a recipe in this sense for making a world.
In the above mentioned paper, John Hawthorne criticizes this strategy.
Hawthorne argues that any materialist global supervenience thesis that
quantifies over fewer than all metaphysically possible worlds would allow for
the unwanted metaphysical possibility of something he calls blockers. Blockers
are non-physical entities that block the emergence of properties that
would
normally (given the normal absence of blockers) supervene on physical
properties. A world physically indiscernible to our world that contains blockers
might, for example, lack consciousness entirely. Hawthorne goes
on to claim
that the possible existence of blocker-worlds entails the
possible existence of
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zombie worlds .35 As any self-respective physicalists would not be happy with a
thesis that entailed the possible existence of zombie worlds, physicalists should
not be comfortable with global supervenience theses that are too weak to rule
out the metaphysical possibility of blockers.
Hawthorne believes that a supervenience thesis is adequate for
physicalism only if it admits the metaphysical possibility of possessor-worlds
but denies the metaphysical possibility of blocker-worlds. Possessor-worlds are
compatible with physicalist intuitions because the possessors are merely
something extra that do not have any effect on the physical world. The possible
existence of blocker-worlds, on the other hand, would undermine the
physicalist' s intuition that the physical facts at a world determine the non-
physical facts at that world .36 Or, so Hawthorne argues. But is a blocker world
really the same as a zombie world? Another way of putting this question is to
ask whether physicalists should really have a problem admitting the
metaphysical possibility of blocker-worlds. Remember that David Chalmers,
who advocates the metaphysical possibility of zombie worlds, believes that is it
metaphysically possible, although not physically possible, foi a minimal
physical duplicate of our world to lack consciousness. But advocates of (MDGS)
need not admit this possibility. According to advocates of (MGDS), the physical
way things are fixes the mental way things are at any minimal physical
duplicate of the actual world. In other words, in Chalmers zombie worlds
the
mental way things are and the physical way things are come apart
more easily
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than they do in blocker worlds. Physicalists should have clear intuitions about
Chalmer's zombie world (that they are metaphysically impossible), but they
need not have clear intuitions about blocker worlds. That is, physicalists can
disagree as to whether they are genuine metaphysical possibilities or not.
But there is a further problem with (MDGS). This problem is related to
Kim and Petrie's criticism of global supervenience. Their criticism of global
supervenience fails because global supervenience theses make claims about
what holds at all metaphysically possible worlds, and which worlds are
metaphysically possible is a matter of necessity not stipulation. But theses like
(MDGS) make claims about a smaller set of worlds than global supervenience
theses, because they make claims only about those worlds that are physically
indiscernible from the actual world. (MDGS) says nothing about any world that
differs from the actual world in any physical respect— e.g., by having an extra
ammonia molecule on one of Saturn s (or Saturn s counterpart s) rings. It is
consistent with (MDGS), then, that such a world could be as different from the
actual world in non-physical respects as you please. Physicalists should ideally
say that the connection between the physical and non-physical propeities is
stronger than such a possibility implies .
37
Perhaps we will have better luck with the second strategy available
to
the physicalist — of restricting the worlds under consideration
only to those in
which no non-alien properties exist. Let us consider the following
claim.
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(NAGS) Non-alien possible worlds that are indiscernible with respect to their
physical properties are otherwise indiscernible.
As long as our world is neither a possessor- nor a blocker-world — an
assumption that should be acceptable to physicalists — it should be the case that
any non-alien possible worlds that are physically indiscernible are otherwise
indiscernible. (NAGS) makes no claim about worlds in which alien properties
are instantiated, however, so (NAGS) does not rule out the metaphysical
possibility of either possessor- or blocker-worlds. And this seems right.
Physicalists who are willing to accept the possibility that there are worlds
containing angels should also be willing to accept the possibility that there are
worlds containing blockers. The possible existence of blocker worlds does not
threaten the truth of physicalism in the way that the possible existence of
zombie worlds threatens physicalism. In conclusion, I am rejecting
Hawthorne's requirement that a supervenience thesis is adequate for the
physicalist only if it admits the metaphysical possibility of possessor-worlds,
but denies the metaphysical possibility of blocker-worlds. I believe that an
adequate supervenience thesis can admit both the metaphysical possibility of
possessor-worlds and the metaphysical possibility of blocker-worlds, as long as
neither is thought to be possible at worlds in which there are no non-alien
properties instantiated. (NAGS) comes fairly close to capturing the physicalist
intuition that the non-physical objects, events, and properties at
our world (e.g„
biological, psychological, and economic objects, events, and
properties) are had
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in virtue of, or are determined by, the physical objects, events, and properties at
our worlci.
Conclusion
There are three main issues about which nonreductive physicalists might
plausibly be thought to have an opinion: ontological considerations about the
types of things that exist at a world, issues of determination involving the
existence and nature of a dependence relationships between the types of things
that exist at a world, and epistemological questions regarding the best way to
describe, explain, or characterize the types of things that exist at a world. I have
argued that physicalists must be committed to the thesis that every particular in
space and/or time is, or is composed out of, fundamental physical particulars
(OC), and I have argued that physicalists must be committed to the thesis that
any two non-alien worlds that are physical duplicates are duplicates simpliciter
(NAGS). I still need to say whether physicalism makes an epistemological claim
as well.
I think it does not. That is, I think there is no single epistemological claim
that all physicalists would accept. Reductive physicalists have a very different
understanding of the epistemological requirements of physicalism than do
nonreductive physicalists. In fact, one of my main claims in this thesis is that
reductive and nonreductive physicalists differ primarily with
respect to their
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epistemological claims. Thus I would disagree with Beckermann when he
insists that:
Someone is a materialist or physicalist if and only if he claims that there
is nothing but physical objects and events, and that all that can be
meaningfully said about these objects and events can be expressed in physical
language . 2’8
Whereas a reductive physicalist might claim that all that can be meaningfully
said about objects can be expressed in physical language, one of the main
claims of nonreductive physicalism is that the special sciences have an
important explanatory role to play that cannot be replaced physics, even in
theory. Nonreductive physicalists deny that the physical sciences provide us
with the conceptual and representational resources adequate for describing and
explaining everything within the physical world .
39 They deny this point on the
grounds that the taxonomies employed by the special sciences do not neatly
relate to taxonomies in physics. Special-scientific-kinds cannot be identified
with physical kinds, as special-scientific kinds are both compositionally
and
configurationally plastic .40 The fact that the special sciences cross-classify
physics in this way suggests (though it does not conclusively
prove) that
physics cannot explain everything that the special sciences
explain.
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CHAPTER 2
A HISTORIC LOOK AT NONREDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM
Any discussion of nonreductive physicalism will have to confront the
problem that the term 'reductionism' has been used in myriad ways over the
last several decades. In fact, this is one of my main points! It is because the term
has been used so variously that philosophers cannot just claim to have proven
reductionism
,
or claim to have proven nonreductionism
,
without offering a fairly
detailed explication of what they mean by 'reduction.' Only after it is clear what
they take the term to mean can we evaluate their arguments and see whether
they succeed against their intended target. As will become clear in the second
half of this chapter, I think that many of the recent criticisms of nonreductive
physicalism fail to hit the right target. I take that target to be the classic, and
historically influential, nonreductive physicalist positions of philosophers such
as Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Geoffrey Heilman and Frank
Thompson, and Richard Boyd. Each of the aforementioned philosophers wrote
at least one influential article advocating nonreductive physicalism between the
years 1965 and 1980. So influential were these articles, that the views articulated
therein have become synonymous with nonreductive physicalism in many
philosophers' minds. Thus in order to avoid arguing against a straw man,
critics of nonreductive physicalism must direct their attacks, in part at least,
against the positions held by one or more of these thinkers.
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Reductionist Theses
Before delving into the details of these nonreductive physicalists'
positions, it would be useful to look at the vastly different types of views that
have been called 'reductive' in the philosophical literature over the years. I
begin this chapter with just such a survey. Later, I will look at arguments
espoused by several well-known nonreductive physicalists to see which of the
theses they reject (either explicitly or implicitly). Finally, I will offer a
suggestion as to which theses contemporary nonreductive physicalists should
probably reject, and to which they should probably accept. Here, then, are the
candidate 'reductive' theses:
Semantic Reduction - S is semantically reduced to T if and only if S can be
translated into T without loss of meaning (where S and T are words or
sentences). Alternatively, S' is semantically reduced to T if and only if all the
sentences in S' can be translated into sentences in T' without loss of meaning
(where S' and T' are languages). 1
Ontological (micro) Reduction - A's are ontologically (micro) reduced to B's if
and only if As are just Bs (where A's are macroscopic objects and B's are
physical particulars).
Empirical Reduction2 - M is empirically reduced to P if and only if it turns out
that “M-1 and refer to identical things (where M and P are objects,
phenomena, or properties, and -M- and -P- are the names for those objects,
phenomena, or properties).
Inter-theoretic Reduction - Reduction is thought of as a relationship between
theories. There have been many attempts to capture this relation of inter-
theoretic reduction; here are three of the more influential ones:
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ReductioriN (Nagel's Inter-theoretic Reduction) - Theory Ti is inter-
theoretically reducedw to theory To just in case the laws of Ti can be deduced
from the laws of To, along with the appropriate bridge statements connecting
the theoretical vocabulary of Ti and To.
• ReductionKO (Kemeny and Oppenheim's Inter-theoretic Reduction) -
Theory Ti is inter-theoretically reducedKO to theory To if and only if any
observations and facts explained by Ti are equally well explained by To, and
To is at least as powerful and well systematized a theory as Ti.
• ReductionNw (New Wave Inter-theoretic Reduction) - Theory Ti is inter-
theoretically reducedNW to theory To if and only if To fulfills the explanatory
role that Ti once fulfilled, and an analogue of Ti (a corrected version of Ti)
can be deduced from To.
Causal Reduction - A is causally reduced to B if and only if the causal powers
of A are entirely explainable, or entirely determined, by the causal powers of B
(where A and B are objects, events, properties, or physical particulars). 3
Metaphysical (property) Reduction - An A-family of properties is
metaphysically reduced to a B-family of properties if and only if for every a in
A there is a b in B such that it is necessary that a b.
Before going on to discuss specific nonreductive physicalist positions, I will
make a few short comments about each of the aforementioned types of
reductionism.
The first thing to note about semantic reductionism is that philosophers
are no longer sanguine about the possibility. Over half a century ago
philosophers like Rudolf Carnap had argued that statements couched in the
language of psychology could, without loss of explanatory power, be
reformulated as statements couched entirely in the language of physics .
4 As this
type of reductionism is now out of favor, it is safe to assume that
the reductive
physicalists I will be discussing are not arguing for semantic reductionism.
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(Although nonreductive physicalists do sometimes write as if semantic
reductionism is their target.)
Depending on how it is construed, ontological or micro reductionism is
either a fairly uncontroversial thesis or a very controversial thesis. The
controversy surrounds the interpretation of the “are just" relationship. If it
indicates a relation of composition or constitution, then nonreductive
physicalists can accept ontological reductionism (some would accept the
mereological relationship of composition, whereas others would accept the
relationship of constitution with its attendant additional ontological
commitments). If it indicates a relation of identity, however, then the claim that
macroscopic objects are ontologically reducible to microscopic particulars may
be very controversial. Recently, Lynne Rudder Baker and Mark Johnston have
argued that the relation between macroscopic objects and the microscopic
particulars that constitute these objects cannot be identity. It cannot be identity
because macroscopic objects and collections of microscopic particulars have
different temporal and modal properties.5 Whereas macroscopic objects can lose
or gain small amounts of constituting stuff without going out of existence,
collections of microscopic particulars cannot. On the other hand, collections of
microscopic particulars can survive certain compositional changes, like
squashing, that the macroscopic object cannot.6
The view that reduction involves an empirical identity claim was held by
J. J. C. Smart and U. T. Place in the 1950s.
7 Relying on Frege's distinction
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between meaning and reference, Smart and Place argue that mental terms and
physical terms pick out the same phenomena or property, even though they
differ in their intension or semantic meaning. (Just as the phrase 'the morning
star' denotes the same heavenly body, Venus, as the phrase 'the evening star,'
although these phrases differ in intension.) Smart and Place are often criticized
for assuming that the identity relationship is contingent, as many philosophers
have been convinced by Saul Kripke's arguments that all-true identity
statements are metaphysically necessary . 8 Nevertheless, Smart and Place were
right to point out the lack of entailment between semantic irreducibility and the
claim that the objects, phenomena, or properties involved are metaphysically
distinct. Note, though, that their position that mental terms systematically pick
out the same phenomena as physical terms would not be accepted by most
nonreductive physicalists. Physicalists must believe that physical stuff
composes, constitutes, or realizes the mental on every occasion in which the
mental is instantiated (at least at our world), but they need not believe that
there is a systematic correlation between mental phenomena, or properties
picked out by mental terms, and physical phenomena, or properties picked out
by physical terms . 9 That is, they need not believe in what has been called type
physicalism.10
The assumption that by 'reduction' we really mean inter-theoretic
reduction' is often held implicitly by many of the participants in the debate
over
nonreductive physicalism. In fact, in many cases philosophers assume
that the
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conditions (or some close analogue of the conditions) for inter-theoretic
reduction laid out by Ernest Nagel in his 1949 article, "The Meaning of
Reduction in Natural Science," are either necessary or sufficient for reduction. 11
As I will argue below, I do not think that satisfying these conditions is sufficient
for inter-theoretic reduction. (I do not think that satisfying these conditions is
necessary either, but this latter point has been made times before.) 12
For Nagel, a reduction is successful only when the laws of the reduced
theory are shown to be a logical consequence of the laws of the reducing theory.
When the two theories are homogeneous with one another— that is, when their
observational and theoretical vocabulary is the same — the derivation is
unproblematic. However, when the two theories are heterogeneous — that is,
when they contain different observational or theoretical vocabulary — a formal
derivation is possible only if we can establish bridge connections between the
terms in the reduced theory and some subset of terms in the reducing theory.
These bridge connections are thought to be underwritten either by a logical
relationship between the conventional meanings of the expressions involved, or
by an empirical discovery that the states of affairs designated by the terms in
the primary science are sufficient (or necessary and sufficient) for the state of
affairs designated by the terms in the secondary science.
This much about Nagel's views is well known. What is often overlooked,
is that Nagel insisted on logical derivability and bridge connections
only
because he was committed to the following two assumptions: 1)
that the
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purpose of inter-theoretic reduction is to explain the reduced theory by means of
the reducing theory, and ii) that all legitimate scientific explanations can be
recast as deductive arguments, (ii) amounts to the claim that an adequate
scientific explanation would have to satisfy the formal requirements of Carl
Hempel's deductive-nomological model (D-N) of explanation . 13 But now note
that although we do still accept Nagel's first assumption, that the purpose of
inter-theoretic reduction is to explain the reduced theory by means of the
reducing theory, contemporary philosophers of science have largely abandoned
his positivist second assumption . 14 Thus anyone who thinks that satisfying the
D-N criteria is not necessary for scientific explanation should also think that
bridge connections are not necessary for inter-theoretic reduction. And anyone
who thinks that satisfying the D-N criteria is not sufficient for scientific
explanation should also think that bridge connections are not sufficient for
inter-theoretic reduction.
At around the same time that Hempel published his criteria for inter-
theoretic reduction, Kemeny and Oppenheim proposed a competing account
that specifically rejects Hempel's requirement that there be bridge connections
between the theoretical vocabulary of the reduced and reducing theories.
According to Kemeny and Oppenheim, the central purpose of scientific theories
is to explain and predict observations. A reduction is effected when a more
powerful and systematic theory is able to explain and predict all the
facts and
observations that the old theory once handled. Note that
their account
61
preserves the central intuition that reduction is bound up with explanation,
without saddling the account with any particular theory of scientific
explanation. Where their account seems to go wrong is in requiring us to make
sense of the idea that there can be theory-independent facts and observations.
In order for a theory To to reduceKO a theory Ti, To must explain the same facts
and observations that Ti was once thought to explain. Thus anyone who thinks
that facts and observations are inextricably linked with the theoretical
perspective from which they were made would not be happy with the formal
requirements of Kemeny and Oppenheim's account of inter-theoretic
reduction . 15 Nevertheless, there does seem to be something right about their
account. We do expect the more powerful reducing theory to play the role (if
not the same role, at least a similar role) that the reduced theory once played.
According to new wave reductionists, the goal of inter-theoretic
reduction is explanatory unification and ontological simplification. A successful
reduction should be able to explain why the old theory worked (or was thought
to work) as well as it did, and where it went wrong. Although new wave
reductionists generally assume that scientific explanations should satisfy the
D-
N model's criteria, what gets deduced from the new theory may be only an
image or analogue of the old theory (a corrected version of the old
theory
couched in the language of the new theory). Because the bridge
statements are
considered part of the reducing theory we avoid the problem
of specifying their
logical status . 16 In smooth reductions, reductions in which
the ontological
62
commitments of the old theory are generally preserved, reductions will license
property identities or correlations. In bumpy reductions, reductions in which
the ontological commitments of the old theory are modified or eliminated,
almost nothing of the old theory is preserved and property identities or
correlations are unlikely . 17 Thus new wave reductionists consider cases of
theory elimination or replacement (e.g., the elimination of the phlogiston theory
matter) to be cases of reduction.
Causal reductionism is the most difficult of all the reductive
relationships to characterize. One reason why it is so difficult is that there are
essentially two types of causal reductionist theses that are often conflated
-
causal role reduction and the mereological reduction of causal powers. Each thesis
attempts to capture the idea that the causal powers of one thing are entirely
explainable by, or entirely determined by, the causal powers of another thing.
In order to explain the distinction between the two types of causal
reductionism, I appeal to the following formulations introduced by Peter
Menzies:
Causal Role Reduction - a's being F causally reduces to as being G iff (1) G is a
more fundamental property than F; and (ii) a's being G occupies a certain
typical causal role such that the proposition that it occupies this
typical causal
role entails that a is F . 18
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Mereological Causal Reduction - a's having F mereologically reduces to the
complex event of bi's having Gi, b2's having G2 . . . bn's having Gn iff (i) bi, b2. .
.
bn are constituents of a; and (ii) the proposition that bi has Gi, b2 has G2 . . . bn has
Gn , together with the appropriate bridge laws, entail that a has F.
According to some accounts of functionalism— a view traditionally associated
with nonreductive physicalism— functionalists are committed to causal role
reduction, because they believe that functional properties are second order
properties whose causal powers can be identified with the causal powers of
their realizers. (Just as, for example, we might identify the fragility of a glass
tumbler with some particular causal power of the tumbler's molecular
structure.) The essential thing to note here is that causal role reduction is a one-
to-one relation. An entity has a functional property in virtue of having some
particular causal power.
The thesis of mereological causal reduction, on the other hanci, is a one-
to-many relation. A mereological causal reductionist would claim that the
causal powers of a macroscopic event or object are determined by, and
identical
to, the collection microscopic particulars that constitute the
event or object . 19
The problem that mereological causal reductionists face is that it is
not clear
what should count as the reductive base. If the reductive base is
confined to the
intrinsic properties of the microscopic particulars that
constitute this event or
object, then the thesis is not very plausible. (Or, so it seems
to me.) On
externalist views objects have causal powers that neither
supervene on, nor
reduce to, the parts that constitute these objects .
20 And although broadening the
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reductive base to include a larger spatio-temporal region, or to include my
parts' relational properties, would make mereological causal reductionism a much
more plausible thesis, the revised version would no longer constitute a threat to
nonreductive physicalism. It is hard to see how we would have a reduction to a
physical explanation if what gets included in the reductive base depends on
individuation conditions established by the special science, as would be the
case if we included only those relational properties that are needed to
determine the object's causal powers (rather than including all the object's
relational properties).
In recent years philosophers have moved away from thinking of
reduction as primarily a relationship between theories, as Ernest Nagel
assumed, to thinking of reduction as primarily (or importantly) a relationship
between properties. There are many explanations for this shift in language and
thought. First, analytic philosophy has made a metaphysical turn in recent
years, and talk of properties is at the center of this turn. Second, properties are
critically important to many central issues in philosophy, including issues
involving identity, causation, and explanation. And third, the last 30 years has
seen a variety of supervenience theses flourish, which are typically formulated
as relationships between families of properties. Furthermore, in
speaking of
properties, philosophers can appear to preserve some of the
details of the
dominant account of inter-theoretic reduction (Ernest Nagel s), by
recasting his
requirement that there be empirically discoverable bridge
connections between
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the terms of the reduced and reducing theories. They can recast it as a
requirement that there be nomically necessary bridge connections between the
properties picked out by the reduced and reducing theory.
There has been an especially lively debate over the question of whether
strong supervenience is really a type of reductionism in disguise . 21
Philosophers who argue that it is a type of reductionism point out that the
strong supervenience thesis allows for nomically necessary bi-conditional
bridge connections between a supervening property and the complex property
that is the disjunction of all the properties on which the supervening property
supervenes. Philosophers who argue that strong supervenience does not license
reductions claim that identities between macroscopic properties and potentially
infinite disjunctions of gerrymandered physical properties is not a type of
reductionism about which any nonreductive physicalist need worry. They do
not need to worry about this type of reductionism, as mental and special-
scientific theories and descriptions would still have a role to play in practice
(and in theory if the translation fails to be recursively enumerable). More on
this debate when I discuss the disjunctive move in the third chapter.
The Classic Accounts
Now that we have specified a few of the more common types of
reductionism, we can turn to particular nonreductive physicalists
to: i) see
which type of reductionism they reject, and ii) determine to which
theses
66
nonreductive physicalists should be committed. What follows are discussions
of the classic accounts of nonreductive physicalism— accounts by Donald
Davidson, Hillary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Geoffrey Heilman and Frank
Thompson, and Richard Boyd.
Davidson
I begin my discussion of the classic accounts of nonreductive physicalism
with Donald Davidson's enormously influential article, "Mental Events," in
which he introduces a position he calls anomalous monism .22 Davidson argues
that although mental events are token identical to physical events, the mental is
not reducible to the physical, because "No purely physical predicate, no matter
how complex, has, as a matter of law, the same extension as a mental
predicate ." 23 With his commitment to monism, Davidson explicitly endorses
some form of metaphysical or ontological reductionism; with his commitment
to mental/ physical anomaly, he denies that the mental is either semantically or
inter-theoretically reducible to the physical. It is not semantically reducible to
the physical because we cannot translate mentalistic descriptions into
physicalistic descriptions without losing explanatory power. As Davidson puts
it, he is advocating only a bland monism — although every mental event is a
physical event, it is impossible to eliminate mentalistic descriptions (even in
theory) because of the lack of conceptual relationships between mentalistic
and
physicalistic terms.
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For Davidson, the issue of whether the mental is inter-theoretically
reducible to the physical hinges on the question of whether mental predicates
are suitable for law-like statements. The issue of whether mental predicates are
suitable for law-like statements hinges on his particular understanding of laws.
Davidson takes laws to be true law-like statements; he take law-like statements
to be general statements that support counterfactual and subjunctive claims and
that are supported by their instances. Davidson believes that the normative and
holistic features of the mental make mental predicates unsuitable for law-like
statements. If mental predicates are unsuitable for law-like statements, they
cannot figure in laws -thus, a fortiori, they cannot figure in bridge laws. Hence,
psychophysical reduction is impossible, according to Davidson, because there is
no way to reduceN the mental to the physical.
Davidson has been criticized in recent years for his belief that his
supervenience thesis gets him mental/ physical dependence without
mental/ physical reducibility.^ If Davidson holds merely a weak super\ enience
claim -the claim that at no world can objects differ with respect to their mental
properties but fail to differ with respect to their physical properties- then he
cannot do justice to the intuition that the mental depends on the physical. A
weak supervenience thesis is compatible with the possibility that there are
worlds physically identical to our world that lack any conscious experience.
Weak supervenience theses have this consequence because they allow that the
dependence relationships holding between sets of properties at one world
may
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fail to hold between those same sets of properties at another world. If, however,
Davidson holds a strong supervenience thesis, he gets inter-world comparisons,
and perhaps a type of dependence, but only at the expense of his
nonreductionism. Or, so the argument goes.
If we confine ourselves to the remarks he makes about supervenience in
"Mental Events," it is not clear which type of supervenience relationship
Davidson is advocating. The first statement he makes about supervenience is
consistent with his holding merely a weak supervenience claim. Davidson
writes, "Such supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two
events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect." Here
the 'cannot' is plausibly interpreted as a claim about only intra-world
possibility, thus allowing for the possibility that entities at worlds physically
indiscernible to our world might lack mentality. The second statement
Davidson makes about supervenience, which he mistakenly takes to be
equivalent to his first statement, supports a stronger claim. Davidson writes,
"Or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some
physical respect." Here the cannot refers to ways that a single object might
have been, and thus ranges over possible representations of that object across at
possible worlds. Although Davidson has since admitted to holding merely a
weak supervenience claim, it is not clear that this is really the position he
should take. In committing himself to a weak supervenience thesis,
Davidson is
forced to abandon his contention that the mental depends on physical
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properties in any real sense. 25 I suspect that Davidson commits himself to a
weak supervenience thesis for fear that the stronger thesis would raise the
unwanted specter of reductionism.26 If this is the case, then Davidson would be
better off adopting either a strong or a global supervenience thesis.27 Although
both strong and global supervenience theses do license property reductions,
they need not license inter-theoretic reductionN, so long as the mere existence of
universally quantified biconditional bridge connections between psychological
terms and non-recursively-definable-infinitely-long disjunctions of physical
terms fails to suffice for theory deduction.28 Moreover, even if bridge laws
involving infinite disjunctions is sufficient for theory deduction, and thus
sufficient to establish inter-theoretic reductions they may not be sufficient for
scientific explanation, so long as deduction fails to be sufficient for explanation
(a claim that even contemporary deductivists hold).
Putnam
In the late 60s and early 70s, Hilary Putnam advocated a position that he
believed to be both nonreductionist and physicalist. Putnam argued that mental
states, like the state of being in pain, cannot be empirically reduced to physical-
chemical brain states, because mental states (unlike brain states) are functional
states of an entire organism. 29 Putnam directs his criticism at Smart and Place s
brain state hypothesis— the hypothesis that mental states are type-identical
to
brain states. Putnam points out that the brain state hypothesis is
implausible, as
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it is empirically unlikely that a single physical-chemical correlate will be found
across species for mental states like 'pain' or 'the belief that P.' Putnam
expresses his skepticism of the brain state hypothesis in the following oft
quoted passage:
Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims.
He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism (not
just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of a
suitable physical-chemical structures; and (b) its brain is in that physical-
chemical state. This means that the physical-chemical state in question
must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a
mollusc's brain (octopuses are molluscs, and certainly feel pain), etc. At
the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the
brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if
such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will
also be a state of the brain of any extra-terrestrial life that may be found
that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the
supposition that it may be pain.30
Because it is possible for psychological states like pain to be multiply realized in
different types of physical stuff, psychological states cannot be identical with
physico-chemical brain states. Putnam argues that psychological states should
instead be thought of as abstract functional states that hold of the entire
organism. Note that Putnam's functionalism is incompatible not only with the
brain state hypothesis, which he calls 'empirical reductionism,' but also with
certain versions of micro-reductionism and mereological causal reductionism.
Functional states are characterized by sets of typical inputs and outputs to some
system. If mental states are functional states, then the existence of a mental
state
m in system S would depend on features that are extrinsic to any particular
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realization of m— namely, on the set of typical inputs and outputs that are
characteristic of m in S.31 Thus, if Putnam's functionalism is correct, it would
not be true to say that a mental state is nothing but a collection of intrinsic
physical particulars, as certain versions of micro-reductionism hold, nor would
it be true to say that the causal role of a mental state is identical to, explainable
by, or even supervenient on, the causal roles of the physical particulars that
constitute m, as mereological causal reductionism holds.
In "Reductionism and the Nature of Psychology" Putnam explicitly
rejects his earlier (1958) claim that higher-level sciences, like psychology, are
inter-theoretically reducible to lower-level sciences, like physics.
32 Here, as in
the article discussed above, Putnam assumes a representational reading
reduction. One science is reduced to another science if and only if we can explain
the laws and observations of the first science using the conceptual resources of
the second science. Here, again, Putnam explicitly rejects Nagel's criteria for
reduction. He points out that it is often possible to deduce the behavior of a
system from a description of the behavior of its component parts
without being
able to explain the behavior of this system with such a description.
For example,
although we may be able to deduce that a particular 1" square peg will
not go
through a particular 1" round hole from a description of the
microstructure of
the peg and the board in terms of particle positions, velocities,
and electrical
activity, we may not be able to explain why the square peg does not go
into the
round hole from such detailed scientific information. Not
every deduction
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counts as an explanation ; whereas the addition of irrelevant premises does not
threaten the status of deductions, explanations that include explanatorily
irrelevant details may cease to be explanatory.
Putnam's main point is that explanation is not a transitive relation. The
microphysical explanation of an event can be illuminating without the
microphysical explanation being able to explain all the phenomena that depend
on the event's microphysical details. Transitivity fails whenever the parent
explanation contains information that is irrelevant to what we want to explain,
or the information is in a form that makes what we want to explain impossible
to recognize. Putnam argues that although physics may be able to explain why
a particular peg and board are rigid, and physics may be able to describe the
relative sizes of the pegs and holes, such explanations would not explain why
the square peg fails to go through the round hole. 33 In order to explain why the
square peg fails to go through the round hole, we would have to appeal to
abstract geometrical principles that are not expressed at the microphysical level.
According to a common criticism of the 1973 article, Putnam is claiming
that no explanation of a particular peg and board's microstructure can capture
the abstract generalization that rigid square pegs do not in general go through
rigid round holes of approximately the same size, regardless of whether
the peg
and the board are made of wood, plastic, or metal. In other words, Putnam is
accused of assuming that the physical explanation would have to make
essential reference to the type of material out of which the peg and
board are
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constituted — so that a physical explanation of why a square wooden peg fails to
go through a round hole in a wood board would not be able to explain why a
similarly sized peg and board made out of hard plastic should produce the
same phenomenon. The critic goes on to rightly point out that many physical
explanations are abstract enough to apply across material types. The gas laws,
for example, describe collections of gas molecules in a closed container, not
collections of nitrogen, oxygen, or helium molecules. But this criticism misses
Putnam's main point. Putnam does not rest his criticism of reductionism on the
assumption that physical explanations make essential reference to particular
materials — and thus are unable to capture higher-level abstract
generalizations -but on the assumption that the physical explanation would be
too convoluted and detailed to bring out the salient explanatory features of the
phenomena being explained. Moreover, Putnam does recognize that physical
explanations truck in abstractions. Note that he speaks of the physical
explanation of the peg and the board in terms of particle positions, velocities, and
electrical activity, not in terms of the molecular activity of any particular kind of
stuff. In conclusion, this criticism does not succeed in attacking Putnam s main
(epistemological) point.
Fodor
In fact, the criticism is more appropriately directed at arguments
introduced by Jerry Fodor in, "Special Sciences, Or the Disunity of Science
as a
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Working Hypothesis ." 34 In this influential article, Fodor argues that it is
empirically unlikely that the special sciences will reduce to physics because:
(a) interesting generalizations (e.g., counter-factually supporting
generalizations) can often be made about events whose physical
descriptions have nothing in common; [and] (b) it is often the case that
whether the physical descriptions have anything in common is, in an
obvious sense, entirely irrelevant to the truth of the generalization, or to
their interestingness, or to their degree of confirmation, or, indeed, to
any of their epistemologically important properties .35
In other words, there may be nothing physically in common between the
various event instances falling under a single special-scientific description.
Similarly, there may be nothing physically in common between the various
instantiations of a special-scientific kind M. Without a common physical
description, laws that mention M cannot be translated into physical laws.
Suppose (to use Fodor's example) we tried to translate Gresham's Law
into a physical law. (Gresham's Law is a law in economics that says that
whenever you have two equally valued monies in circulation, one good and
one bad, the good money will be hoarded and the bad money will be
circulated.) According to Ernest Nagel's criteria for reduction, in order for
economics to reduce to physics we would have to be able to derive every true
economic law from statements couched entirely in the language of physics.
However, because economics and physics use different theoretical vocabulary,
the only way to formally derive economic laws from statements couched
entirely
in the language of physics is to translate economic laws into physical
terms.
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Assuming that Gresham's law is true, in order to be able to translate the law
into physical terms we would have to be able to substitute a physical predicate
for 'money.' This we cannot do given the multitude of physical realizations of
money (gold, copper, paper, shells, etc.). The problem is that any candidate
physical predicate would be, at best, merely an unsystematic disjunction of
heterogeneous predicates in physics. Furthermore, even if we could identify the
disjunction of physical predicates that pick out money at our world, there
would still be an infinite number of physical predicates that pick out money at
other possible worlds. Chances are slim that this disjunction of physical
predicates— either the disjunction that picks out money at our world, or the
disjunction that picks out money at all possible worlds -is something about
which any relevant physical generalization can be made .36 If no relevant
physical generalization can be made about the disjunction, then the disjunction
does not pick out a physical kind?7
It is important to realize that for Fodor kindhood and lawhood are
connected concepts. Something is a kind if and only if it appears in the
antecedent or consequent of a true scientific law. If the kind predicates of S aie
identified merely with unsystematic, heterogeneous, unprojectable, and open-
ended disjunctions of physical predicates, we might plausibly say that we have
discovered bridge connections between the predicates of S and the predicates
of
physics, but we will not have established bridge laws. This is because
"laws"
involving such disjunctions would not be explanatory. Without bridge laws ,
we
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cannot satisfy Nagel's requirement that reduced theories be formally deducible
from reducing theories. Here is a more formal representation of Fodor's
argument:
(i) The predicates representing special-scientific kinds can be identified (if
at all) only with unsystematic disjunctions of physical predicates.
(ii) Unsystematic disjunctions of predicates do not pick out kinds.
(iii) Laws connect kind predicates with kind predicates.
(iv) Thus, unsystematic disjunctions of kind predicates are unsuitable
for laws.
(v) Anything unsuitable for a law is unsuitable for a bridge law.
(vi) Reductions require bridge laws.
(vii) Thus, the laws of the special sciences cannot be reduced to
physical laws . 38
Note that Fodor seems to be assuming (unlike Putnam) that the physical laws
true of any particular monetary transaction would have to make essential
reference to the type of material out of which the money is constituted .
34
Therefore, if Putnam's critics are right that physical descriptions can be
abstractions that apply across material types, then the mere fact that a special
scientific kind is multiply realized in different types of material stuff will not
give Fodor what he needs for his argument. He needs to prove that special-
scientific kinds fail to be identical to physical kinds. However, given that
physical kinds may be abstractions, it is still an open possibility that these
multiply-realized-special-scientific kinds are identical with abstract physical
kinds after all .40
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Many philosophers have pointed out that Fodor's requirements for
reduction are rather stringent. They claim that Fodor is wrong to have such a
specific picture of what a law looks like (especially given that he admits that the
notion of lawhood is somewhat 'murky'). If we instead take a law to be any
necessary connection between properties, then necessary connections between
properties represented by disjunctive predicates should count as laws, and
hence should count as 'bridge laws.' I will present this objection to Fodor's
argument when I discuss challenges to the multiple realization argument in the
third chapter.
Heilman and Thomson
I will not be able to do justice to Heilman and Thomson's extremely
difficult article, "Physicalism: Ontology, Determinism and Reductionism,"
here . 41 Nevertheless, as this article was very influential in convincing
philosophers of the coherence of nonreductive physicalism, it is worth noting
what they take reductionism to be. Heilman and Thomson argue that the
principles of ontological physicalism (everything is exhausted by mathematical-
physical entities), and physical determination ( physical facts determine all the
facts) are compatible with nonreductionism. They take reductionism to be the
thesis that all scientific terms, including terms from psychology and the special
sciences, can be defined in physical terms. They take definitions to require
nomologically necessary connections between the antecedent and consequent
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terms. Heilman and Thomson argue that this type of reductionism is false, as it
is impossible to find finite sentences in the vocabulary of physics that are
nomologically correlated with every special scientific law and description.
Thus, like the other nonreductive physicalists discussed so far, Heilman and
Thompson assume that a reduction would have to satisfy Nagel's criteria for
inter-theoretic reduction. (Remember that according to Nagel inter-theoretic
reduction is possible only when all the terms that figure in the laws of the
reducing theory can be translated into the language of the reduced theory.)
Heilman and Thompson's main point, then, is that our failure to translate
mentalistic descriptions into physicalistic descriptions means that we cannot
reduceN psychology to physics.
Boyd
In "Materialism Without Reductionism: What Physicalism does not
Entail," Richard Boyd argues that, contra what he takes to be the reductionist's
assumption, physicalism does not require "the definability of all mental and
psychological states (or, on some accounts, all token mental and psychological
states) in the vocabulary of physics ." 42 Boyd argues that psychological states are
not definable in physical terms, as they are neither type nor token-identical with
physical states. Boyd takes type physicalism to be the thesis that there are
identities of the form 'pain = c-fiber firings,' and token physicalism to be the
thesis that there are identities of the form 'John's pain at t
= x (where x is some
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specific physiological state of John at t). Only if there were identities between
rigid designators (terms that pick out the same object, or type of object, at every
world at which they refer) would the mental reduce to the physical. However,
we do not have identities between rigid designators, because mental states are
compositionally-plastic-functional states. Although they are realized in or
constituted out of physical states, they cannot be identified with those states, as it
is always possible for them to have been realized in or constituted out of
different physical states. As Boyd writes:
Against the definability of mental events, states, and processes in
physiological terms (via even possibly infinite definitions) I argue that,
according to the most plausible materialist understanding of mental
phenomena, it is logically possible -indeed, even physically possible
-
for these phenomena to be realized by entirely inorganic mechanical
computers and, thus, that they can be realized by systems that possess
no physiological definition whatsoever." (p. 93)
Boyd claims that it is even possible (at least, logically possible) for a mental
event, state, and process to be non-physically realized. All that is essential to a
mental state is that it possesses a certain computational or informational
processing role; it is not essential that it have any particular constitutional or
compositional properties. Hence, although Boyd (like all physicalists) accepts a
certain type of ontological reductionism, he does not agree with Davidson and
Fodor that mental events and states are token identical to physical events and
states. Here, greatly simplified, is the argument against token identity.
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1) If mental states are token identical to physical states, then it would not be
possible for the same mental state to have been constituted out of
different physical stuff.
2) However, it is possible for the same mental state to have been constituted
out of different physical stuff (either different kinds of stuff, or different
tokens of the same kind of stuff).
3) Therefore, mental states are not token identical to physical states.
Leibniz's law tells us that if mental state m and physical state p are identical,
then anything true of m is true of p as well.43 If (2) is true, however, m would
have a property (being necessarily identical to m) that p lacks, so m and p
cannot be identical. There are two types of support for (2): first, m might have
been constituted by a different type of physical stuff if, counter-factually, the
brain in which m is lodged had been made of silicone; and, second, m might
have been constituted by a different token of physical stuff if, counter-factually,
the bearer of m had eaten slightly different food as a child. Had she, for
example, eaten oatmeal instead of barley cereal as a baby her brain would have
been constituted by different molecules, and p would not have constituted m.
44
Notice that Boyd's argument is open to the same criticism as was
Fodor's. We cannot assume that just because a mental state is multiply realized
in many different types of physical stuff that it is impossible to translate
mentalistic predicates into physicalistic predicates. Physics employs a gamut of
abstract terminology that refers to multiply-realized-compositionally-plastic
states (e.g., the state of having mass). It certainly seems possible both that mental
states are functional states, and thus entirely configurationally defined, and that
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there is a physical expression that captures these functional or configurational
states. It may be unlikely, but it is nevertheless possible.
Conclusion
Now that we have examined the classic accounts of nonreductive
physicalism in some detail, let us consider which of the reductive theses
discussed earlier are (and are not) compatible with nonreductive physicalism.
All the classic accounts reject semantic reductionism. The belief that mentalistic
descriptions play an explanatory role that cannot be easily replaced is, after all,
one of the central intuitions of nonreductionism. All physicalists should, and
do, accept the uncontroversial version of ontological or micro-reductionism (the
version that interprets the relationship between mental events, states, and
processes and physical events, states, and processes to be that of composition or
constitution rather than identity). The debate over empirical reductionism is
somewhat dated. As physicalists, nonreductive physicalists should assume that
mental objects and phenomena are physical. However, they need not to hold
that there are necessarily physical names for these objects and phenomena.
Most nonreductive physicalists explicitly reject type physicalism (the view that
there is a systematic correlation between mental phenomena, or properties
picked out by mental terms, and physical phenomena, or properties picked out
by physical terms). All are mental realists, however, in that they do not think
that our inability to identify mental and physical kinds threatens the legitimacy
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of mentalistic descriptions. What about causal reductionism? Note that Fodor
and Davidson, as token physicalists, believe that particular examples of mental
causation are identical to particular examples of physical causation. On the other
hand, Boyd and Putnam, as functionalists, believe that we cannot identify
mental events with the physical events that compose or constitute them.
Whether nonreductive physicalists believe in property or metaphysical
reductionism depends on which version of supervenience they hold. As I argued
in Chapter One physicalists must believe in at least a global supervenience
claim— that is, they must believe that once you fix the physical facts at a world
you have fixed all the facts .45 Furthermore, any nonreductive physicalist who
accepts a strong supervenience claim has to believe that there are correlations
between mental and physical properties, albeit physical properties that are
potentially represented by complex, disjunctive predicates whose instantiations
are gerrymandered (in other words, not the types of explanatory correlations
that science is apt to discover). 46
Let us turn our attention to the different accounts of inter-theoretic
reductionism. All the classic accounts of nonreductive physicalism were written
before philosophers started talking about new wave reductionism ; nevertheless, it
seems clear that nonreductive physicalists would not be sanguine about the
prospects for psychophysical reductionNW. Of course they would not be able to
prove that the mental is irreducibleNW, as reductionNW is an empirical claim. For
historical reasons I do not yet understand, many of those who have argued that
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the mental is 11 reducible to the physical, and those who have argue that the
mental is reducible to the physical, have assumed that reduction should be
understood according to Nagel's model, rather than Kemeny and Oppenheim's
model .47 Thus, Davidson, Fodor, Putnam, and Heilman and Thompson think it
sufficient to defeat reductionism to prove that it would be impossible to
establish bridge laws between mental predicates and physical predicates
.
48 On
the other hand, some of the arguments for reductionism on a priori grounds
(e.g., arguments by Kim, Loar, and Francescotti) assume that they have
established reductionism merely by establishing the existence of necessary
connections between mental and physical properties 49 But, as I will discuss in
the third chapter, no contemporary philosopher of science believes that logical
derivability is sufficient for scientific explanation. So proving that there are
necessary connections between mental and physical properties (or predicates)
will not prove that mental objects, events, or properties can be explained by
physics. However, neither will proving the absence of necessary connections
between mental and physical kinds prove irreducibility, if contra contemporary
deductivists logical derivability fails to be necessary for scientific explanation. It
is time to move on from the discussion of bridge laws.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MULTIPLE REALIZATION ARGUMENT
One reason for nonreductive physicalism's supposed falsity is that it
rests on an unsound argument
-the multiple realization argument (MR). In my
third chapter I discuss four challenges to MR. I argue that although the
challenges do succeed in showing MR to be unsound, they do not succeed in
showing nonreductive physicalism to be false. Multiple realization is neither
necessary nor sufficient for irreducibility. To show how common the
assumption is that multiple realization is bound up with the issue of
reductionism, I offer the following testimonials:
The argument from multiple realizability provides perhaps the main
reason why psychophysical reductionism is out of fashion in the
philosophy of mind . 1
It is part of today's conventional wisdom in philosophy of mind that
psychological states are 'multiply realizable', and are in fact so realized,
in any variety of structures and organisms. ...And there is an influential
and virtually uncontested view about the philosophical significance of
MR. This is the belief that MR refutes psychophysical reductionism once
and for all . 2
The belief in multiple realizability is one of the main reasons for the
popularity of nonreductive physicalism .3
Each of the above quoted philosophers goes on to argue— rightly, in my
opinion— that the multiple realization of psychological-kind properties in
disparate physical properties is not necessarily a barrier to psychophysical
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reducibility. Each also argues— mistakenly, in my opinion
-that defeating the
multiple realization argument shows nonreductive physicalism to be false or
incoherent. I hope to convince my reader that multiple realization is not as
pivotal to the debate over reductionism as it may have first appeared to be.
Before going on to discuss specific challenges to the multiple realization
argument, it would be useful to understand the argument a little better.
Actually there are really two arguments here— Hilary Putnam's argument that
the compositional plasticity of psychological kinds defeats Smart and Feigl's
brain-state identity thesis, and Jerry Fodor's argument that the multiple
realization of psychological- and other special-scientific kinds establishes the
irreducibility of the special sciences to physics. Let us briefly examine both
arguments.
Putnam is usually credited with having been the first to claim that
mental states are multiply realizable. In "The Nature of Mental States," Putnam
argues that mental states are functional states of an entire organism, identified
by their inputs and outputs.4 If mental states are functional states, then even if a
mental state M is always realized by brain state B in humans at our world, we
cannot identify M with B. We cannot identify M with B, as long as it is possible
for M to be instantiated without B-e.g., in structurally dissimilar creatures like
animals or Martians. Here, more formally, is Putnam's main argument:
1. If it is possible for mental state M to be instantiated without brain state B,
then M is not identical to B.
94
2. It is possible for M to be instantiated without B (e.g., in structurally
dissimilar animals and Martians).
3. Therefore, M is not identical with B.
In evaluating the soundness of this argument we should remember that Putnam
does not direct his argument against reductionism in general (he has a much
better argument against reductionism in his 1973 article, "Reductionism and the
Nature of Psychology"). 5 Rather, Putnam directs his multiple realization
argument against Smart and Feigl's brain-state identity hypothesis — the
hypothesis that mental states are identical to brain states. Against this
hypothesis, the argument works beautifully. As long as it is possible (in this
case physically possible) for mental state M to be instantiated without brain
state B, we cannot claim that M is identical to B.
Thus it is unfair to criticize Putnam's multiple realization argument for
failing to prove nonreductionism, as this was never the intent of the argument.
On the other hand, in "Special Sciences: or The Disunity of Science as a
Working Hypothesis," Jerry Fodor does argue that the multiple realization of
special-scientific kinds (including psychological kinds) entails the irreducibility
of the special-sciences (including psychology) to physics.6 Remember Fodor's
picture of the relationship between the special sciences and physics. Fodor
claims that any case in which a special-scientific law, Si-»S2 , holds there are
physical laws between the token realizers of Si and S2 on something like the
following model:
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Special science law:
Disjunctive predicates of
reducing science:
Laws of reducing science:
Figure 1: Fodor's Model
Note that although most of Si's token-physical realizers cause one of S2's token-
physical realizers to be instantiated, there will always be exceptions, as special-
scientific laws hold only ceteris paribus.7 Given how important this picture has
been to non-reductive physicalists, I take it that those who argue that multiple
realization presents a problem for reductionism accept something like the
following argument:
1. Special-scientific-kind properties (in particular, mental-kind
properties) are multiply realized in disparate physical properties in
something like the way that Fodor's model pictures.
2. If special-scientific-kind properties (in particular, mental-kind
properties) are multiply realized in disparate physical properties in
something like the way that Fodor's model pictures, then the special
sciences (including psychology) are not reducible to physics.
3. Therefore, the special sciences (including psychology) are not
reducible to physics.
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This is the argument I am calling The Multiple Realization Argument (or MR for
short). To convince us that (1) is plausible, Fodor offers the example of money,
which he rightly points out can be multiple realized in gold, paper, shells, etc.
He offers two reasons for thinking that (2) is true. First, he claims that the
biconditional connections between special-scientific-kind properties and their
realizers — e.g., connections such as Si<-» ( Pi v P2V...Pn, P') and S2<-> (P*i v P* 2
v. . .P*m ) — are not law-like, and thus are not suitable candidates for the bridge
laws that Nagel's model of reduction requires. Second, he claims that the
connections between the disjunction of Si's realizers and the disjunction of S2's
realizers — e.g., connections such as (Pi v P2 v...Pn)—»(P*i v P*2 v...P*m) — are not
law-like. Neither type of connection is law-like, according to Fodor, because
neither type of connection could ever figure in an explanatory scientific law.
I will now discuss four challenges to MR. They are: i) the observation
that many respectable physical properties are just as multiply realized as are
psychological properties; ii) the argument that the multiple realization of
special-scientific and psychological-kind properties in disparate physical
properties does not rule out reductions to abstract-physical, or physical-
functional, properties; iii) the claim that local reductions (e.g., species-specific
reductions) should be reductions enough; and iv) the argument that if there are
nomologically-necessary biconditional connections between each mental-kind
property and a complex physical property (perhaps one that is expressed by a
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disjunctive predicate), then reductionism follows. All four challenges aim to
show that MR is unsound because its second premise is false. The mental could
still reduce to the physical even if mental properties are multiply realized in
disparate physical properties exactly as Fodor describes. The fourth challenge,
known as the disjunctive move, goes further to argue for a positive claim as well.
Advocates of this last challenge argue that the multiple realization insight
supports not the irreducibility of the special sciences to physics, but
(surprisingly) a type of reductionism instead. I will argue that the first three
challenges do succeed in showing MR to be unsound, but that the fourth
challenge fails to establish reductionism (at least it fails to establish a type of
reductionism about which nonreductive physicalists need worry).
First Challenge to MR: The Ubiquity of Multiple Realization
The first challenge to the multiple realization argument goes something
like this. It is observed that just as many respectable physical properties are
multiply realized as are special-scientific properties . 8 The property having a mass
ofone gram, for example, is realized in all sorts of physical stuff, yet properties
like having a mass of are paradigms of respectable physical properties.
Many philosophers have pointed out that even temperature- that classic
example of a reduced property — is also multiple realized. This point is important
because many take the identification of temperature with mean molecular
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kinetic energy to have enabled the reduction of the Boyle-Charles's gas laws to
statistical mechanics (one of the paradigm cases of inter-theoretic reduction).
Not only is temperature variously realized in different types of material
stuff (after all, samples of helium, carbon, and iron all have temperatures), but
we can identify the property having temperature with the property having mean
molecular kinetic energy only in gases, and even then only under certain
conditions. In solids temperature is constantly switching between a kinetic and
potential mode. Even vacuums (where there is no mass at all), and high
temperature plasmas (where the molecules have been ripped into sub-atomic
parts) are thought to have temperatures. Obviously temperature in a vacuum or
plasma is not going to be identical with mean molecular kinetic energy. Nor can
we restrict the identification to temperature in gases. As C. A. Hooker points
out, physicists identify temperature with mean molecular kinetic energy only in
gases that have a Maxwellian distribution (are in random motion).9 Neither a
single gas particle, nor a collection of gas molecules that are streaming down a
tube in laminar flow, have a temperature that can be identified using concepts
from thermodynamics. What this discussion shows is this: i) that the
phenomenon of multiple realization is fairly common, and ii) that the mere fact
that kind-property s of some special science S is multiply realized in disparate
types of physical stuff does not entail either the irreducibility of s to any
physical property, or the irreducibility of S to physics. If in even the paradigm
cases of reduction we do not have correlating laws between the kind properties
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of the reducing and reduced science, then Fodor's requirement that there be
such laws for genuine reduction is probably too strict. If the requirement is too
strict, then Fodor fails to prove the irreducibility of the special sciences to
physics simply by showing that this requirement is not satisfied. The upshot of
this first challenge is to show that the multiple realization of special-scientific
properties in disparate types of physical stuff is compatible with the
reducibility (as scientists understand that term) of the special sciences involving
these properties to physics. If this challenge succeeds, the second premise of
MR will be shown to be false. Multiple realization will be shown to be
insufficient for irreducibility.
Second Challenge to MR: Reduction to Functional Properties
Advocates of the second challenge claim that we cannot conclude from
the fact that a mental kind is multiply realized in disparate types of physical
stuff that there is not some physical description, at a higher and more abstract
level, that picks out a physical state or property type-identical to the mental
state or property . 10 Several philosophers have argued that this higher and more
abstract level of description is a functional description. The mental is reducible
to the physical because mental states can be identified with, and hence reduced
to, functional states . 11 Some argue that merely by construing mental states as
functional states we have already reduced the mental to the physical (because a
functional state is a type of physical state). I hope the reader will agree that this
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strategy should be faulted for trying to get reductionism too cheaply. There is
genuine debate over whether reductionism follows from functionalism, or
whether functionalism shows reductionism to be likely false. Thus anyone who
wants to convince us that functionalism entails reductionism has to do more
than just stipulate this point.
A more sophisticated and substantive position is offered by David Lewis
(in 1969 and 1972) and Kim (in 1998).12 Here is how Lewis argues we should go
about a functional reduction of mental states to physical states:
1) We construe, using conceptual analysis, a mental state M as the state
that occupies a certain causal role.
2) We identify, through empirical scientific investigation, the physical
state P that occupies the M-role in the actual world.
3) Finally, we contingently identify the mental state M with the physical
state P.
The identity between M and P is contingent , as it is possible that states other
than P realize M (for example, structurally different states in mollusks and
Martians). Furthermore, it is possible that P exists and yet fails to realize M (as
P might have different causes and effects).13 The latter is possible because P is
merely a narrow physical state (e.g., a brain state). By definition, functional
states cannot be identified with narrow physical states, as functional states are
defined externally in terms of their causes and effects.
In response to Putnam's claim that that there is plausibly no single
physical-chemical state common to all pains — whether in humans, Martians, or
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mollusks — Lewis argues that type identity is too strong a constraint on the
brain state theorist. 14 A more reasonable picture instead.
Would anticipate that pain might well be one brain state in the case of
men, and some other brain (or nonbrain) state in the case of mollusks. It
might even be one brain state in the
case of Putnam, another in the case of Lewis. No mystery: that is just like
saying the winning number is 17 in the case of this week's lottery, 137 in
the case of last week's. 15
Although this week the winning lottery number is 17, the identity between 'the
winning lottery number' and '17' is merely contingent, as the winning lottery
number (taken de dicto ) might have been 23, had 23 been drawn instead of 17. In
modern philosophical idiom '17' is a rigid designator, but 'the winning lottery
number' is not. This week 'the winning lottery number' picks out 17, last week
'the winning lottery number' picked out 137, and next week it will likely pick
out yet another number. If mental states are to be understood on the analogy of
winning lottery numbers, then we will not have identities between
psychological and physical types. Instead we will have a description in
psychological terms that contingently picks out a physical type. Mental states,
in other words, will not be rigid designators.
Notice that Lewis does not try to establish the reduction of psychology to
physics on a priori grounds. Rather, he believes that the empirical facts at our
world are such that there are brain-state types realizing most human
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psychological-state types. If Lewis is right, this would certainly auger well for
the reduction of at least human psychology to some physical science. Whether
there is this degree of uniformity in nature is, however, an empirical question.
Those with reductionist leanings are more sanguine about the possibility than
those with nonreductionist leanings. Furthermore, many believe that there is
greater cause for optimism for mental states with a clear physiological basis
(like pain), than for intentional mental states (like the state of thinking about
Michelangelo's statue of David), which are plausibly not entirely physiological.
The important point is that by merely construing (or reconstruing) a mental
state M as a functional state (Lewis's step one) you have not yet reduced M to a
physical state. All step one does is prime M for reduction. In the end, M will be
reduced only if it turns out that there is a single physical-state type that realizes
M for some relevantly large structure class (like a species). 16 Again the issue is
empirical. A Lewisian functional reduction establishes psychophysical
reductionism only if the empirical facts turn out to be a certain way. I think this
is the right way to look at the question of reductionism, although I do not share
the reductionist's optimism regarding the extent to which such correlations will
be discovered.
Kim's functional reduction is similar to Lewis's, except that he takes
functional properties to be second order properties with first order realizers.
According to Kim, we first construe a mental property M relationally as a
second order property defined by its causal role. For example, the
property of
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being in pain would be defined as the property of having a property with certain
characteristic causes and effects (e.g., caused by pinpricks and causing yelps
and avoidance behavior). Next we find the properties or mechanisms that
satisfy this causal role in the actual world. If in the actual world P turns out to
be the physical property that fits M's causal specification, then we have an
identity of sorts between M and P . 17 This identity is merely nomologically
necessary, however, not metaphysically necessary, as M is defined in terms of
its causal/ nomic relations to other properties (relations that are contingent on
the laws at a given world ). 18
Unlike Lewis, Kim (surprisingly) claims to establish reductionism on a
priori grounds. Kim argues that a functional conception of mental properties is
"necessary and sufficient for reducibility ." 19 I have to admit that I am not sure
what Kim means by this claim. Suppose we were to construe the property of
believing that there is beer in the fridge functionally in terms of its extrinsic-causal
role, and suppose further that despite tons of research we were not able to
identify a single physical state that realized this mental state for any significant
structure type. Would this mental state have been reduced? Given what he says
elsewhere, it seems that Kim should answer 'no' to this question .20 However if
Kim says no, then it is not clear what benefit we get from being told that a
functional conception of mental properties is sufficient for its reducibility.
In conclusion, Lewis and Kim are right that the functionalization of
mental states/ properties does not guarantee their irreducibility, or the
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irreducibility of the sciences that refer to these states/ properties. If it turns out
that a single physical state, P, realizes M in humans at our world, we would be
justified in believing that we could explain M in terms of P, even if M were to
be differently realized in other species, and it were metaphysically possible for
M to be differently realized in other-worldly humans. If this second challenge
succeeds, we have yet another reason for believing the second premise of MR to
be false. Again we see that more is needed to establish the irreducibility of the
special sciences than the mere possibility that special-scientific kinds are
multiple realized.
Third Challenge to MR: Local Reductions
The third challenge to the multiple realization argument, the argument for
local reductions, is closely related to the second challenge. Proponents of this
challenge claim that even if Putnam is right that psychological-kind properties
are realized differently in mammalian brains, reptilian brains, mollusk brains,
and Martian brains, such multiple realization does not rule out local or species-
specific reductions. It is still possible that within each species or structure type
there is a single physical state that is both necessary and sufficient for the
instantiation of that psychological property . 21 Although the multiple realization
of mental properties ensures that we will not have completely general laws on
the model of M<h>P, where M is a mental property and P is a physical property,
we might still have species-specific laws on the model of Sp->(M^P), where Sp
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represents some particular species or structure type. Surely such local
reductions, the challenger insists, are reductions enough.
And in fact it does seem right to say that were we to identify mental-
kind properties with physical-kind properties within even a single species we
would be justified in calling our ciiscovery a reduction. Suppose we discovered
physical correlates for most human mental kinds. Certainly such a discovery
would justify us in saying that human psychology would have thereby been
reduced to neurology, as we would then be able to explain human psychological
properties, laws, and generalizations in terms of physical states of the human
brain. Were this type of local reductions to be widespread, such a discovery
would certainly threaten nonreductive physicalists' intuition that we cannot
explain psychological laws and generalizations using the conceptual resources
of physical theory.
It is less clear, however, whether we would have a type of reduction that
would threaten non-reductive physicalists' intuitions if Sp turned out to be a
much more fine-grained structure, such as the structure that consists of Hilary
Putnam's brain at time t. In his recent book, Mind in a Physical World , Kim
claims that even in cases of.
Wildly heterogeneous multiple realization everywhere among humans,
and for the same individual over time, there still would be structure-
specific biconditional laws (if psychology is indeed physically realized),
and there would be perfectly good local reductions, even if they are only
for single individuals at a particular moment of their lives .
22
106
Although wildly heterogeneous multiple realization would not give us species-
specific reductions, we could still reduce mental properties like 'pain in
Putnam/ or 'pain in Putnam at t' to physical properties because we would have
laws such as the following: (Putnam's brain at f)-»(M<-»P). But do such
connections entail reductionism? Certainly philosophers are free to define their
terms as they wish. They are free, for example, to call this type of property
relationship a 'reduction' if they so desire. What they cannot do, however, is
claim that as a result of this definitional fiat they have thereby shown
nonreductive physicalism, as the view is held by its advocates, to be false or
incoherent.
Fourth Challenge to MR: The Disjunctive Move
Advocates of the fourth challenge, known as the disjunctive move, make a
much bolder claim than was made by advocates of the first three challenges.
They claim that not only does MR fail to establish nonreductionism, it fails
spectacularly. It fails because a closer analysis of the multiple realization
relationship reveals that anyone committed to multiple realization is also
(surprisingly) committed to reductionism. Multiple realization entails
reductionism because it shows mental properties to be reducible to multiply-
based physical properties (I will explain what this means shortly). A quick caveat
before we begin. It is important to realize that although Jaegwon Kim has
written a great deal about the disjunctive move in recent years, the argument
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does not really represent his considered views. Often, Kim uses the disjunctive
move dialectically to advance a position he calls mental property irrealism. I
briefly discuss Kim s strategy at the end of this paper. The disjunctive move is
still worth arguing against, however, as many philosophers do believe in and
have advocated such a move.23
I will now attempt to explain the assumption undergirding the
disjunctive move. Note that any given instance of a mental kind M must be an
instance of some physical realizer or another. Let us assume that M can be
realized by Pi, P2...Pn, and that, furthermore. Pi, P2...P11 are all the possible
realizers of M. If, as is customary to assume, a realizer is sufficient for what it
realizes (as we will see below, by no means an innocent assumption), then M is
nomologically correlated with the property that represents the exhaustive
disjunction of all the Ps (Pi v P2 v...Pn). Let us call such a property Pf. P| is
what I am calling a multiply-based physical property. Given this picture of the
relationship between mental and physical properties, I take advocates of the
disjunctive move to be offering something like the following argument:
1) If the mental is multiply realized in the physical, then there are
nomologically necessary bridge connections between every mental
property and some multiply-based physical property (on the model of
M^Pf). 24
2) If there are nomologically necessary bridge connections between every
mental property and some multiply-based physical property (on the
model of M<->Pf), then psycho-physical reductionism is true.
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3) Therefore, if the mental is multiply realized in the physical, then psycho-
physical reductionism is true.
The onus of this argument rests on the second premise. Is the existence of
nomologically necessary connections between every mental property and some
multiply-based physical property sufficient to establish a type of reduction that
would threaten nonreductive physicalism?25 I think it is not. Let me explain
why.
Given the myriad of uses to which the term reduction has been put over
the last several decades, we need to be especially careful to avoid equivocation.
The first premise claims that mental properties have a certain metaphysical
relationship to physical properties. Specifically, it claims that for each mental
property M there is some, perhaps complex, physical property P that is both
necessary and sufficient for it. I think this premise is true. Furthermore, I think
this premise does establish a type of reductionism. Specifically, it establishes a
type of reductionism that in Chapter Two I called metaphysical reductionism. To
remind the reader, here is how I defined metaphysical reductionism
:
An A-family of properties is metaphysically reduced to a B-family of
properties if and only if for every a in A, there is a b in B such that it is
nomologically necessary that a <-> b. 26
So advocates of the disjunctive move are right that multiple realization
establishes some type of reductionism, as it establishes metaphysical
reductionism. But metaphysical reductionism does not threaten the classic
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accounts of nonreciuctive physicalism- accounts by Donald Davidson, Hilary
Putnam, Jerry Fodor, Richard Boyd and Geoffrey Heilman and Frank
Thompson. At least, not without further argument. The metaphysical
reductionist relationship is very weak; it is so weak that anyone who is a
physicalist (either reductive or nonreductive) should probably accept it. 27 And,
in fact, none of the above mentioned nonreductive physicalists explicitly reject a
relationship like metaphysical reductionism. In fact, Fodor, in "Special Sciences:
Still Autonomous After All These Years," explicitly accepts such a
relationship. 28 All do, however, explicitly claim that psychological laws cannot
be captured by, or explained by, physical laws. That is, all explicitly reject some
form of epistemological or representational reductionism. Thus anyone who
wants to show that the multiple realization argument supports a type of
reductionism that threatens the coherence of nonreductive physicalism (as the
view is held by its advocates) will have to prove that metaphysical
reductionism has some epistemological import, perhaps by showing that it
establishes some form of intertheoretic reductionism.
This is just what Kim tries to do in his 1989 Eastern APA Meeting
Address, "The Myth of Nonreductive Physicalism." Here is what Kim says in
this address:
As we have seen, reduction of one theory to another is thought to
require the derivation of the laws of the reduced theory from the laws of
the reducer via "bridge laws". If a predicate of the theory being reduced
has a nomologically coextensive predicate in the reducing theory, the
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universally quantified biconditional connecting the two predicates will
be available for use as a bridge law. Let us say that the vocabulary of the
reduced theory is "strongly connected" with that of the reducing theory
if such a biconditional bridge law correlates each predicate of the former
with a predicate of the latter. It is clear that the condition of strong
connectibility guarantees reduction (on the assumption that the theory
being reduced is a true theory). For it would enable us to rewrite basic
laws of the target theory in the vocabulary of the reducer, using these
biconditional laws in effect as definitions .29
If we can identify mental-kind properties with multiply-based-physical
properties, we can make the following move. For each mental predicate p,
representing mental property M, there will be a complex bridge law of the form
p<-»7ti v 7i2 v. . .7in that holds with at least nomological necessity (where rci v 712
v...7in represents all the physical realizers of M). The existence of bridge laws
like v 7i2 v... 7Tn allows us to translate — in theory, at least— any law that
mentions p into laws that mention only ns. If we can theoretically translate
psychological laws into statements couched entirely in the language of physics,
then Ernest Nagel's requirements for intertheoretic reduction will be satisfied .30
Metaphysical reductionism will be shown to have epistemological implications,
as psychology will be shown to satisfy Nagel's requirements for reduction.
In the remaining pages I offer two criticisms of the claim that the
disjunctive move establishes intertheoretic reductionism. First, I point out that
type of bridge laws between psychological and physical predicates that the
disjunctive move establishes does not threaten the core intuitions behind
nonreductive physicalism. Second, I argue that a closer investigation of the
realization relationship shows either that the disjunctive move does not
establish any type of reductionism, or that, again, it establishes a type of
reductionism that does not threaten the core intuitions behind nonreductive
physicalism. At the end of the paper, I will look at how Kim uses the disjunctive
move to argue not for reductionism, but for a view he calls mental property
irrealism.
First Criticism of the Disjunctive Move
In the APA address Kim suggests that the existence of nomologically
necessary bridge connections between psychological properties and physical
properties, on the model of establishes the existence of universally
quantified biconditionals between every mental predicate and some disjunction
of physical predicates, on the model of p<-»7nv 712 v... 7tn . He further suggests
that this strong connectability between mental and physical predicates guarantees
psycho-physical reductionism, because it would (in theory at least) allow us to
rewrite the laws of psychology in the vocabulary of physics. I will argue that
this second suggestion rests on a mistaken conception of reduction. There are
many reasons to question the assumption that the existence of a purely
theoretical translation suffices for intertheoretic reduction, but this is my claim
here. Nor am I raising the point that it is possible that some of the possible
realizers of psychological properties may not be physical, and thus that we may
not be able to correlate the psychological property with even a complex physical
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property . 31 Nor am I resting my criticism on the fact that the disjunction that is
nomologically correlated with p is plausibly infinite, and thus that it would be
impossible to perform a translation in any finite amount of time .32 Instead, I
wish to point out that it is curious that any philosopher would hold that strong
connectability guarantees intertheoretic reduction. Remember that in order to
prove that physicalists are committed to psycho-physical reductionism, on the
basis of their commitment to bricige laws like p<-»7n v 712 v. ..nn, critics of
nonreductive physicalism have to assume that satisfying Ernest Nagel's criteria
suffices for intertheoretic reduction. Remember, too, that Nagel required bridge
laws between terms in heterogeneous theories only because he was committed
to the now discredited D-N model of explanation. Thus my first criticism of the
disjunctive move relies on looking closely at Ernest Nagel's account of
intertheoretic reduction. A lot rests on this account. Fodor argues that
reductionism is false because Nagel's criteria are unfulfilled; whereas, the
disjunctive move argues that reductionism is true because Nagel's criteria are
fulfilled.
According to Nagel's classic account of intertheoretic reduction,
reduction is a relationship between theories construed as sets of sentences. One
science is reduced to another science only when the laws of the reduced theory
are shown to be a logical consequence of the laws of the reducing theory. When
the two theories contain different observational or theoretical vocabulary, a
formal derivation is possible only if we can establish bridge statements, or bridge
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laws, connecting each term in the reduced theory with some term in the
reducing theory. As I pointed out in Chapter Two, contemporary philosophers
often forget that Nagel insisted on logical derivability and bridge laws only
because he was committed to the following two assumptions: i) that the
purpose of intertheoretic reduction is to explain the reduced theory by means of
the reducing theory, and ii) that all legitimate scientific explanations can be
recast as deductive arguments . 33 Also remember that although we do still
accept Nagel's first assumption -that the purpose of intertheoretic reduction is
to explain the reduced theory by means of the reducing theory — contemporary
philosophers of science have largely abandoned his positivist second
assumption .34 Although contemporary philosophers of science disagree as to
whether satisfying the D-N model's criteria is necessary for explanation, no
philosopher of science believes that deduction is sufficient for explanation (the
assumption that the disjunctive move relies on). 35
In fact, even contemporary deductivists do not think that theory
deduction suffices for explanation and reduction. For example, Philip Kitcher,
who is committed to a view he calls deductive chauvinism (the claim that all
explanation is deductive) is expressly not committed to the claim that all
deductions are explanatory .36 According to Kitcher, explanation is
fundamentally a matter of showing how numerous disparate conclusions about
the world can be derived from a small set of premises. Deductions become
explanatory-in Kitcher's words, part of the explanatory store - only when the
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pattern they exemplify helps us systematize and unify our understanding of the
world. For Kitcher (and for other contemporary deductivists) deductions,
although necessary, are expressly not sufficient for scientific explanation.
Here is an analogy for the situation we are in: If A, B, and C are necessary
for D, and it is shown that B cannot be satisfied, then we know that D is not the
case. However, if it is merely shown that B is satisfied after all, then we are
unable to infer anything about the status of D. Fodor had argued that we could
not have a reductionN between the special sciences and physics, because a key
requirement of reductionN — that there be adequate bridge laws between
special-scientific-kind terms and physical-kind terms — is unsatisfiable. The
disjunctive move shows that Fodor's conditions for adequacy were too strict,
and that in fact we do have adequate bridge laws between special-scientific-
kind terms and physical-kind terms. Thus the disjunctive move shows that
Fodor's criticism of reductionism fails. He is wrong to claim that the fact that
psychological states are multiply realized "Refutes psychophysical
reductionism once and for all." 37 However, even if Fodor's criticism of
reductionism fails, we are not thereby entitled to claim anything about the
status of reductionism; that one condition for reduction is satisfied does not
mean that all the conditions are satisfied.
One reason the disjunctive move may have seemed plausible to us is due
to the attention that footnote five of Chapter 11 of Nagel's The Structure of
Science has attracted over the years. 38 Nagel begins this footnote by pointing
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out that connectability via uniconditional bridge laws between terms in the
reduced theory (what he calls 'A terms') and terms in the reducing theory (what
he calls 'B terms') is not generally sufficient for reducibility. However, he adds,
if it should happen that for some theory T every A-term is linked via a
biconditional to some B-term in the reducing theory, on the model of A iff B, then
T would be reduced. T would be reduced because for any law in T we would be
able to replace the A-terms found there with the appropriate B-terms. On the
strength of this footnote, then, it does look like the disjunctive move establishes
reductionismN.
But before jumping to such a conclusion, I urge my reader to once again to
remember the reason that Nagel was interested in bridge laws. Remember that
for Nagel a reduction is "The explanation of a theory or a set of experimental
laws established in one area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not
invariably formulated for some other domain ." 39 Remember, too, that Nagel
assumed that in heterogeneous reductions bridge laws are needed only fulfill
the conditions of what he considered to be the best account of scientific
explanation (the D-N account). Given these assumptions, it seems plausible that
in footnote five Nagel was thinking of biconditional connections between actual
predicates of the two theories. In other words, it seems likely that Nagel was
merely admitting that were the reduced theory to turn out to be merely a
terminological variant of (some part of) the reducing theory this should count
as a reduction. Such a discovery would certainly satisfy Nagel's nonformal
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requirement that reductions be explanatory - that they offer "A significant
advance in the organization of knowledge" and "Be fertile in usable
suggestions for developing the secondary science".40 On the other hand, the
existence of nomologically necessary connections between special-scientific-
kind terms and complex, potentially infinite, Boolean combinations of physical-
kind terms would not offer any significant advance in knowledge. Thus the
disjunctive move does not in fact establish reductionist, as it fails to satisfy
Nagel's nonformal requirement for reduction: that the reduction be
explanatory.
Second Criticism of the Disjunctive Move
To explain my second criticism of the disjunctive move we need to
define better some of the terms we have been using. Let us take a special-
scientific kind (or property) M to be multiply realized by physical kinds Pi,
P2...Pn if and only if for each Pi in the realization base, Pi realizes M. What does
it mean for a kind (or a property) to realize another? When Kim introduces the
disjunctive move, he follows Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer in assuming that
if P, realizes M, then the instantiation of P, is sufficient for the instantiation of
M .41 Although this is a common interpretation of the realization relationship, it
is also a fairly contentious interpretation. Note that in order for Pi to be
sufficient for M, P, would have to be what Sydney Shoemaker calls a total-
realizer of M (as opposed to what he calls a core-realizer) 42
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To explain the distinction between core-realizers and total-realizers, let
us consider the following example. Suppose we are looking for the realizer of
my occurrent belief that I am sitting at my desk typing. If we think of the
realizer as being located in my head (e.g., as a neural pattern or process), then
we are thinking of the core-realizer of my belief. As many have pointed out, the
neural pattern by itself is not sufficient for the belief. This is because whether
the belief is instantiated or not depends on environmental circumstances and
laws that are extrinsic to anything going on within my head .43 So the neural
pattern cannot be the total-realizer of my belief. The total sufficient realizer of
my belief will consist of a much larger spatio-temporal region than that
occupied by the core-realizer (the neural process).
In light of this distinction between core-realizers and total-realizers, it is
clear that many nonreductive physicalists have assumed all along that a realizer
is an insufficient core-realizer. After all, whether pieces of copper, gold, or paper
realize money or not depends on factors that are extrinsic to the physical
properties of the pieces of copper, gold, and paper. If you are not already
convinced of this point, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose an
intrinsic duplicate of one of the green pieces of paper in my wallet were
suddenly to materialize at a world that did not have any institution of money.
Clearly this duplicate piece of paper would not constitute money at that world.
Suppose, further, that an intrinsic duplicate piece of paper were suddenly to
materialize at our world. Clearly this second duplicate piece of paper would not
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constitute money either, as it would not have had the right historical
connections with the monetary institutions at our world. What this last thought
experiment shows is that sometimes a core-realizer can be insufficient for what
it realizes, even when it is situated in the appropriate environmental context. It
will be insufficient when it is important for that core-realizer to have had the
right historical connections to the contingent features at the world .44
What is the importance of this distinction between core-realizers and
total-realizers? Well remember that an advocate of the disjunctive move is
arguing that a special science S reduces to physics whenever for each kind M of
S, realized by physical kinds Pi, P2...P11, there are connections of the form
p<->7tiv 7i2 v... 7in that hold with nomological necessity (where p is the predicate
representing M and 711v 712 v...tt are the predicates representing Pi, P2...Pn). We
now see that whether this is true or not depends on whether Pi, P2.. .Pn , the
physical realizers of M represented by tuv 712 v... 7tn , are core-realizers or total-
realizers. If they are merely core-realizers, as Putnam and Fodor seem to
assume, then we cannot identify the properties and "p-^tiv 712 v... 7rn" is false.
In fact, if each P, is merely a core realizer, then tuv 712 v. . . 7in will not even
designate a special-scientific kind. If they are total-realizers, on the other hand,
then although we can identify the properties, each 7ii would represent such a
large gerrymandered spatio-temporal region that any physical law invoking it
would be very messy. It would be messy because such a law would have to
include all the physically sufficient conditions, both local and non-local, for the
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instantiation of that mental property. Messy laws are a problem if you want
your laws to be explanatory. If each P, is a total realizer, then although the
disjunction of predicates will designate a special-scientific kind, we will never
find an explanatory-scientific law that uses such predicates. Not only will we
not find an explanatory-scientific law that uses the disjunctive predicate mv 712
v.
. .Tin, we will not find an explanatory-scientific law that uses any of the n
predicates singularly either.
I hope I have succeeded in convincing you that the disjunctive move is
not as simple as it first appeared to be. Although the disjunctive move does
establish metaphysical reductionism, metaphysical reductionism does not
threaten the core intuitions behind non-reductive physicalism. The core
intuitions behind nonreductive physicalism are epistemological in nature, but
the disjunctive move has epistemological import only given an assumption that
no one seems to hold — that deduction is sufficient for explanation. Moreover, in
looking closer at the nature of the realization relationship we see that one of
two situations must hold: Either the physical realizers of mental properties are
core realizers, in which case we cannot identity mental properties with them,
and the first premise of the disjunctive argument is false, or the physical
realizers of mental properties are total realizers, in which case such an
identification will not help us explain special-scientific laws in physical terms,
and the second premise of the disjunctive move is false.
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Kim's Views
As I mentioned earlier, despite having done much to popularize the
disjunctive move, Kim is not necessarily an advocate of the move. Oftentimes,
Kim often uses the disjunctive move in the context of a dilemma. Kim argues
that either psycho-physical reductionism is true, because mental predicates are
reducible to disjunctive physical predicates via the disjunctive move, or mental
kinds are not reducible, because they are not respectable scientific kinds after
all .45 As Kim writes:
Either we allow disjunctive kinds and construe pain and other mental
properties as such kinds, or else we must acknowledge that our general
mental terms and concepts do not pick out properties and kinds in the
world .46
In short, if as a physicalist you believe that the mental is realized in the physical
at all, you will have to bite the bullet as either a reductionist or an eliminativist.
As neither bullet is compatible with nonreductionism, nonreductive
physicalism is thereby shown to be false and incoherent. As Kim soon makes
clear, he is advocating the second (eliminativist) horn of the dilemma.
To convince us of the plausibility of the eliminativist move, Kim skillfully
exploits Fodor's justification in "Special Sciences" for dismissing moves like the
disjunctive move. There Fodor claimed any connection involving disjunctive
predicates cannot be a law, as laws connect kind terms with kind terms, and
disjunctive predicates do not represent kinds. For Fodor a law represents more
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than just a nomologically necessary connection between properties. Laws are
found only in the context of explanatory theories. However, disjunctive
predicates do not generally figure in explanatory laws, because, like negative
predicates, they can apply to objects that have little in common with one
another. For example, the predicate "being either a London bridge or an ant" is
true both of the many London bridges and the many ants of this world without
there being anything physically in common between them on the basis of which
an explanatory scientific law might be constructed .47
If something like the above reasoning explains why Fodor dismisses the
disjunctive move, then Kim has a powerful response. Kim argues that it is
precisely because London bridges and ants fail to share any explanatorily
significant physical properties that no scientific law uses the predicate 'London
bridge v ant.' In other words, the predicate fails to designate a natural-kind not
because it is disjunctive, but because the disjuncts represent physically
dissimilar objects. If this is indeed the real reason for excluding disjunctive
predicates, however, then the same reasoning should apply to mental-kind
terms. If the physical realizers of a mental kind are vastly physically dissimilar
to one another, as Fodor maintains is the case, then neither the disjunctive-
physical predicate nor the mental predicate will represent a kind, and thus
neither would legitimately figure in scientific laws. As Kim writes:
The important moral of MR [multiple realization] we need to keep in
mind is this: ifpsychological properties are multiply realized, so is psychology
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itself. If physical realizations of psychological properties are a "wildly
heterogeneous" and "unsystematic" lot, psychological theory itself must
be realized by an equally unsystematic lot of physical theories
.
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According to Kim, then, we should draw one of two conclusions from the fact
that a special-scientific property M is multiply realized: either M's physical
realizers are behaved enough that it makes sense to disjunctively identify M
with them, or M's physical realizers are so unsystematic and heterogeneous
that M does not constitute a genuine kind. Neither option supports a real but
irreducibly distinct M. As I mentioned previously, Kim is ultimately advocating
the second (eliminativist) option. Kim argues that multiple realization calls into
question the legitimacy of mental properties as scientific kinds, and, by
extension, the claim that psychology is a science with a unified subject matter.
Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, and Jerry Fodor have criticized Kim's
eliminativism on the following grounds .49 They argue that not only does the
argument vitiate mental properties, it also threatens the legitimacy of all higher-
order-special-scientific properties (properties like being a cell, a mountain, a
planet, or a species ). In other words, the argument proves too much. If mental
properties are merely ontologically on a par with these other special-scientific
properties, then mental properties are not in that bad shape after all. I think this
is an excellent rejoinder to Kim's argument for eliminativism. Kim seems to
suggest that there is something especially untoward about mental properties,
but it is not clear what it is that makes them more suspect than other special-
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scientific properties, especially given that Kim believes that all mental
properties, save qualitative mental properties, can be functionalized
.
50
Were non-reductive physicalists, and other defenders of mental realism,
forced to take the eliminativist horn of the dilemma. Baker, Burge, and Fodor's
argument would be the best response to the eliminativist charge. However,
non-reductive physicalists are not forced to take the eliminativist horn of the
dilemma. As I hope my criticism of the disjunctive move has shown, they can
happily accept the first 'reductionist' horn. The type of reductionism that the
move establishes is too weak to threaten the core intuitions behind
nonreductive physicalism. Unless critics of nonreductive physicalism can prove
that nonreductive physicalists reject metaphysical reduction, or unless they can
prove that metaphysical reduction has some epistemological import, they will
not have proven that anyone committed to the multiple realization argument is
automatically committed to a type of reductionism that threatens nonreductive
physicalism. The dilemma is false. Physicalists are not forced to choose between
eliminativism and (real) reductionism.
Conclusion
I have argued that the multiple realization of psychological kinds is
neither sufficient for nonreductionism nor sufficient for reductionism. Along
the way I discussed four challenges to the Multiple Realization Argument. The
first challenge shows that Fodor's criteria for reduction are too stringent. If in
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even the classic cases of intertheoretic reduction the reducing properties are
multiply realized, then there is good reason to think that multiple realization
may not be a problem for reduction. The second challenge shows that the
multiple realization of psychological kinds in disparate types of physical stuff
does not rule out reductions to abstract-physical, or physical-functional,
properties. If ever we found enough physical-functional properties that
explained psychological laws and events, we would have a pretty convincing
case of psycho-physical reduction. The third challenge shows that the fact that
mental properties are plausibly multiply realized in structurally-dissimilar
species is not enough to establish reductionism. Were we to find physical
explanations for significant bits of human psychology that should certainly
count as a reduction (even if only a local reduction).
However, neither is multiple realization sufficient for reductionism, as
the disjunctive move (the fourth challenge) argues. Many philosophers seem
convinced that the disjunctive move shows that there is something incoherent
about nonreductive physicalism. Or, in what amounts to essentially the same
argument, many philosophers believe that any version of physicalism that
accepts a supervenience claim strong enough to respect the intuition that the
mental depends on the physical (such as some version of a strong supervenience
claim) is committed to a form of reductionism that threatens nonreductive
physicalism . 51 If I am right that the disjunctive move establishes nothing
stronger than the relationship I have called metaphysical reduction , then
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nonreductive physicalists who understand reduction as an epistemological
thesis can easily accept this type of reduction without threatening their
intuitions about the irreducibility of the special sciences to physics.
To prove that anyone committed to the multiple realization argument
should bite the reductive bullet, metaphysical reduction would have to have
some epistemological import. It would have to entail that theories about the A-
family of properties can be explained in terms of theories about the B-family of
properties. On no one's account of scientific explanation
-neither the ontic,
modal, nor epistemic accounts (see note 35) — does mere property/ predicate
identities suffice for scientific explanation. Moreover, we should not forget
what these property identities are supposed to look like. Psychological-kind
properties, and other special-scientific-kind properties, can be identified only
with open-ended disjunctions of heterogeneous total realizers. Such a reduction
is no threat to any actual nonreductive physicalist position.
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CHAPTER 4
ADDITIONAL A PRIORI CHALLENGES TO REDUCTIONISM
In my fourth chapter, I consider three additional challenges to
nonreductive physicalism. Like the challenges to the multiple realization
argument discussed in Chapter Three, these are challenges either to the truth or
to the coherence of nonreductive physicalism. The three challenges are as
follows: 1) The argument from causation against mental realism. This challenge
worries that if mental events are token identical to physical events, but mental
properties are not reducible to physical properties, then, given the causal
completeness of the physical, mental properties would be causally inefficacious.
The worry is that causally inefficacious mental properties would have a
diminished (a greatly diminished!) ontological status relative to physical
properties. If they have a diminished ontological status relative to physical
properties, then mental realism (a cardinal tenet of nonreductive physicalism)
would be shown to be false. 2) The argumentfrom physical composition for
epistemological reduction. This argument claims that given a basic assumption of
physicalism— that all particulars in space and/or time are either fundamental
physical particulars, or composed out of, fundamental physical particulars
(alternatively, that all properties are either physical properties, or are realized
by physical properties) — a sort of epistemological reduction follows.
Epistemological reduction follows because there will always be some physical
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explanation of special-scientific properties, events, and objects. And, 3) The
Argumentfrom Mysterious Connections. This argument claims that nonreductive
physicalism is committed the existence of brute and inexplicable connections
between special-scientific properties and physical properties. Reductive
physicalism has to be true, the challenger asserts, as only then would we be able
to explain these otherwise mysterious connections.
First Challenge: The Argument from Causation Against Mental Realism
Advocates of the first challenge claim that physicalists have only two
genuine options when it comes to mental causation. Either they accept that the
mental has causal efficacy, but only because mental properties are identical to
physical properties, or they maintain their anti-reductionism, but only at the
expense of their commitment to mental realism. In order fully to understand
this challenge, let us again reflect on the picture that Fodor paints in “Special
Sciences" of the relationship between special-scientific laws and physical laws
(see diagram in Chapter Three). Fodor, remember, claims that whenever an
event that consists in the instantiation of special-science-kind property Si causes
an event that consists in the instantiation of special-science-kind property S2 , we
have a physical realizer of Si (let us call it pi), and a physical realizer of S2 (let
us call it p2), such that pi causes p2 . The problem with this picture is that we are
left to make sense of two competing causes of S2 (Si and pi). Unless we are
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willing to countenance massive causal over-determination, one of these causes
must be the real cause. Here is how Paul Moser describes the problem:
What is the precise relation between (a) a psychological truth such as
that my arm rose because I wanted to lift it and (b) an 'alternative [true]
specification of a sufficient antecedent, which does not mention
psychological categories'?...We have, then, two truths regarding the
causes of my arm's rising: One truth, (a) identifies a mental cause of my
arm s rising, and the second truth, (b), entails a nonmental cause of my
arm's rising
.
1
One initially attractive solution to this problem of competing causes is to accept
Donald Davidson s suggestion that the mental is causally efficacious because
concrete mental events are token-identical to causally-efficacious concrete
physical events . 2 My desire for some chocolate caused me to walk downstairs to
the vending machine, because the concrete event that consists in my desire is
token identical to some causally efficacious neurological event. There is no
mystery about the relationship between the mental and physical cause of my
walking downstairs. The mental cause just is the physical cause under a
different description. According to Davidson, then, mental causation is
unproblematic because physical causation is unproblematic.
Many philosophers have criticized Davidson's solution to the problem of
mental causation for failing to ensure a causal role for mental properties .3 They
point out that Davidson's claim that causality is an extensional relation holding
between concrete event particulars is compatible with the claim that when
events are causally related, they are so related in virtue of something about
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each: their properties.4 Whenever one event a causes another event b, there is
something (we think) about those two events that explains why a caused b. 5
One plausible explanation as to why a and b are causally related is that a is an
event of kind K, and b is an event of kind L, and there is a law relating Ks to Ls.
If Davidson is to remain true to his thesis that the mental is anomalous (not
subject to laws), he cannot hold that the kinds represented by K and L are
mental kinds. But if two events are never related in virtue of their mental-kind
properties, then it looks like an event's mental properties are either causally
inefficacious or epiphenomenal.
Thus in order to make sense of mental causation -and vindicate mental
realism— we need to do more than just establish the causal efficacy of concrete
mental events, we also need to find some causal-explanatory role for mental
properties. Davidson's solution to the problem of mental causation is ineffective
against the following argument:
1) Token Physicalism - Every concrete mental event is token identical to
some concrete physical event.
2) The Completeness of Physics - The causal powers of a physical-event
token are completely determined by its intrinsic physical properties.
3) Irreducibility of the Mental - Mental properties are neither identical
with nor reducible to physical properties.
4) If (1) and (2), then the causal powers of a mental event are completely
determined by its intrinsic physical properties.
5) If the causal powers of a mental event are completely determined its
intrinsic physical properties, and (3), then mental properties are
causally inefficacious.
6) Therefore, mental properties are causally inefficacious.
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7) If mental properties are causally inefficacious, then mental realism, a
cardinal tenet of nonreductive physicalism, is false.
8) Therefore, mental realism, a cardinal tenet of nonreductive
physicalism, is false.
If this argument is sound, the mental will be shown to have a diminished
ontological status relative to the physical, because mental properties will be
shown to lack any genuine causal role. But is this argument sound? (1), (2), and
(3) are all problematic premises. Although Fodor and Davidson would accept
token physicalism, premise (1), many nonreductive physicalists would reject
this premise.6 Any philosopher who believes that the mental is constituted by
or realized in the physical, rather than being identical to the physical, would
reject (1). By Leibniz's law identical things have all their properties in common,
but concrete mental events and the microphysical events that constitute or
realize them do not have all their properties in common, because they differ
with respect to their temporal and modal properties. (2) is problematic because
it suggests a controversial picture of causation— that micro-level causation is
metaphysically prior to (or more real than) macro-level causation. As 1
discussed in Chapter Three, Baker, Burge, and Fodor have all urged us to reject
this picture. They argue that were the assumptions behind this picture to be
generalized that would cast aspersions on most of our familiar examples of
singular causation, including such paradigmatic examples of causation as the
interaction between two colliding billiard balls. It would also vitiate most of our
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favorite examples of causation in the special sciences
-e.g., that the moon causes
the tides to rise and fall. ' Finally, as I argued in Chapter Three, nonreductive
physicalists have little reason to accept (3). Although nonreductive physicalists
do generally believe that we will not find a physical-kind type-identical to each
mental-kind, they can easily accept all sorts of weaker property connections.
For example, they can accept the claim made by metaphysical reduction that for
each mental-property kind M there is a complex physical-property P that is
nomologically correlated with it. Whereas type physicalism would threaten the
claim made by nonreductive physicalists that mental explanations cannot be
replaced by physical explanations, mere metaphysical reductionism would not
have this epistemological implication. If metaphysical reductionism is true,
then every mental-kind property is identical with the complex physical
property that represents the potentially infinite disjunction of that kind's total
physical realizers. I find it hard to imagine how the existence of such property
connections would threaten either the ontological status of mental-kind
properties, or the value of mental explanations.
I wish that my criticism of the above argument were enough to vindicate
mental causation, and, by extension, mental realism. Unfortunately, this is not
the case. Proponents of psycho-physical reductionism need not assume token
physicalism, thesis (1), as a relationship of realization or constitution would
work equally well in this argument. And being told that technically (3) is false,
because mental-kind properties are identical only to properties representing the
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disjunctions of all the total physical realizers of those mental kinds does not
satisfactorily explain why if Fodor's picture is correct there still seem to be two
causes of P2 (Si and pi).
(2), however, remains a problematic premise. As written it is
unnecessarily strong. It is important to distinguish (2), which claims that only
physical properties have causal powers, from the following weaker and more
plausible thesis:
(2') Any physical event that has a cause has a physical cause that was
sufficient to make it happen.
The basic intuition behind the causal closure of the physical is, I submit, merely
that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. If this is true, then (2')
does a better job than (2) at capturing the intuition that the physical world is
causally closed. Furthermore, by replacing (2) with (2') in the above argument,
neither (6), the claim that mental properties are causally inefficacious or
epiphenomenal, nor (8), the claim that mental realism is false, would follow.
However, there are some obvious complications with my proposed
emendation. The main complication is that we now seem committed to there
being more than one causal story for every special-scientific process— at the
very least, we seem committed to there being a special-scientific story and a
physical story. If the special scientific story does not reduce to the physical story
(as nonreductive physicalists believe), how exactly are they related? To put the
point slightly differently, (2') allows for the possibility that events are
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causally/ explanatorily over-determined in some way. That is, it allows for the
possibility that some events have both mental and physical causal explanations.
I believe that this is the right result, as it is the result that best reflects our actual
explanatory practices. However, I realize that I will need to say more if I am to
convince my reader of this point.
Before I try to justify the position, let me first say a little more about how
it might work. I am claiming that although there is only one causal process that
led me downstairs to the vending machine, there are many different
explanations as to why I went downstairs. There is a folk-psychological
explanation that refers to my antecedent beliefs about vending machines and
desires for chocolate, and there is a mechanistic explanation that refers to the
physical properties of my antecedent neurological states. Each 'explanation' is
explanatory in a different context. I am not claiming that this is an original
claim. Many other philosophers have offered similar solutions to the problem of
mental causation. For example, David Owens claims that causal exclusion (an
event has only one cause) is compatible with explanatory pervasion (there are
many true explanations of a single event).8 And David Lewis points out that
what we call a 'cause' is partly a pragmatic matter . 9 There are different causal
explanations of a single concrete event, Lewis claims, because different features
of single causal processes are salient in different explanatory contexts.
Again I wish that my arguments were sufficient to vindicate mental
causation, and, by extension, mental realism. Unfortunately, this is still not yet
141
the case. The suggestion that we can have multiple explanations of a single
causal process has been criticized by Jaegwon Kim in a series of papers in
which he advocates a position he calls explanatory exclusion. Thus in order to
establish the causal-explanatory relevance of the mental we will need to
confront Kim's argument directly. It is to this argument that I turn to next.
Explanatory Exclusion
In several important papers Jaegwon Kim argues that the above
picture
-causal exclusion but explanatory pervasion
-is a mirage
.
10 Kim claims
that a tension exists whenever we seem to have multiple explanations of a
single event. Here is how Kim frames the problem of competing
causes/ explanations:
Given that any physical event has a physical cause, how is a mental
cause also possible? This I call The problem of causal-explanatory
exclusion', for the problem seems to arise from the fact that a cause, or
causal explanation, of an event, when it is regarded as a full, sufficient
cause or explanation, appears to exclude other independent purported
causes or causal explanations of it . 11
Kim argues that the tension is resolved only when we realize that the physical
explanation screens-offany other explanation. This is because no event can be
given more than one complete and independent explanation, and because Kim
assumes that the physical explanation is both complete and independent. In order
to understand EE, then, let us try to understand what Kim means by
explanation, complete (or full), and independent.
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We can think of an explanation as consisting of two types of statements:
the explanandum and the explanans. The explanandum is the statement of the
phenomenon to be explained; the explanans are the statements that are
supposed to explain the explanandum. Kim urges us to accept a claim he calls
explanatory realism
-explanations are explanatory only when the explanans pick
out an objective relationship to the explanandum. Suppose E is the
explanandum that a certain event e occurred, and C is the explanans for E and
the statement that event c occurred. According to Kim, C is an explanans for E
only when the events they pick out, c and e, bear some determinate objective
relation R to each other. Kim notes that it is plausible, but not absolutely
necessary, that R is a causal relation . 12
So now that we know what Kim means by an explanation, let us explore
what he means by a complete (or full) explanation. Consider the explanation as
to why Princess Diana's car crashed. According to the news reports, the car
crashed because they were speeding to escape the paparazzi on motorcycles,
the driver was drunk, and the tunnel was dark and narrow. The paparazzi, the
drunken driver, and the treacherous tunnel are each only partial causes of the
car crash, however. They are only partial causes because each would have been
insufficient by themselves (we will assume) to have caused the crash. Here is
what Kim has to say about a case similar to this:
Neither explanation is complete: each gives only a partial picture of the
causal conditions that make up a sufficient cause of the effect.... where a
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particular causal relation gives us a cause event that is only a partial
cause, or one among the many constituents of a sufficient cause the
corresponding explanans, too, can be thought to be only partial and
incomplete. Conversely, when the causal relation provides a sufficient
cause, the explanans can also said to be complete and sufficient. 1 -^
For Kim, then, a complete explanation of an event is an explanation that cites a
causally sufficient cause of that event. As neither the unrelenting pursuit of the
paparazzi, nor the drunken driver, nor the treacherous tunnel would have been
sufficient for the crash, neither is considered a complete explanation of the car
crash. But why does Kim require that explanations cite sufficient causes? We
know why epistemic accounts of explanation insist that the explanans be
sufficient for the explanandum- because they believe that all genuine scientific
explanations can be recast as deductively valid arguments -but why would a
causal account require sufficiency? Why not follow David Lewis and David
Owens in holding that there are potentially many different explanations of a
single event, each of which cites a different feature of a single causal process.
Although we often think of causes as sufficient for their effects (it is hard to give
up our belief in determinism), it seems strange to require a causal explanation
to spell out causally or nomologically sufficient conditions.
Given Kim's assumption that a causal explanation of some event must
cite the sufficient cause of that event, we might think that a complete
explanation of an event is an explanation that cites the entire causal history of
that event in every detail. Kim agrees that this type of comprehensive
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explanation exists in theory, but denies that this is what he means by a complete
explanation.
The realist scheme also yields a more global sense of "complete
explanation," one in which a complete explanation of an event specifies
its entire causal history in every detail (as we noted earlier, under
explanatory realism each event has a unique determinate causal history).
This is an idealized sense of completeness, and no explanation can be
complete in that sense .14
If in order for explanations to count as adequate they had to be complete in this
idealized sense, then all existing explanations would be inadequate. We never
see such idealized explanation because they are pragmatically useless.
However, if complete explanations are not explanations that cite the entire causal
history of events, what are they?
Kim claims that a complete explanation of an event e is an explanation
that cites causally sufficient conditions for e's occurrence. However, in order for
an explanation to be complete in this way, we would have to be able to fill in all
the necessary ceteris paribus clauses. Remember that by definition a set of
conditions are causally sufficient for an effect only when those conditions
guarantee that the effect will take place. But no set of conditions we will ever be
in a position to cite could guarantee the occurrence of an effect. Each set of
conditions will be causally sufficient only given that the requisite ceteris paribus
conditions are satisfied. As there are likely to be an infinite number of ceteris
paribus conditions, we will never be in a position to cite the full sufficient cause
of an event.
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Consider the case of my walking downstairs to the vending machine to
get the chocolate. Earlier I gave a folk psychological explanation for my
behavior. I explained that I went downstairs because I desired chocolate, and I
believed there to be chocolate in the vending machine. Clearly this folk
psychological explanation does not describe a set of sufficient conditions for my
walking downstairs, as it does not rule out all the possible countervailing
factors. In order to truly be a sufficient explanation, my folk explanation would
have to be hedged by ceteris paribus clauses to eliminate the possibility that I
have other more urgent desires (like the desire to fit into the new dress I just
bought), or other beliefs (like the belief that vending machine chocolate is often
poisoned). And this problem is not particular to folk psychological
explanations. Mechanistic explanations that cite the physical properties of my
antecedent states will, if they are to be causally sufficient, need to rule out
possible paralysis, neuro-physiological breakdown, and various external
interventions. As there are good reasons to believe that it is in principle
impossible to specify all the appropriate ceteris paribus conditions, it is plausible
that we will never be in a position to give a complete explanation of an event e, if
by complete we mean an explanation that cites causally sufficient conditions for
e's occurrence. We can eliminate many of the ceteris paribus conditions by
holding the context fixed, but then we would want to ask what counts as 'the
context'? If the context is everything external to the person's body, then a
complete physiological explanation as to why I went downstairs would have to
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include the entire causal history in every detail, which Kim expressly stipulates he
does not require.
To sum up the points made so far, it is still not clear what Kim means by
a complete cause. It cannot be: a) the entire causal history of e, by Kim's
stipulation, b) a cross-section of the causal history of e
,
^ as there are too many
of them; c) a set of statements that entail the statement that e occurred, as there
is more than one such set16
; or d) a set of conditions that are causally sufficient
to make e happen, because it is impossible to unpack all the ceteris paribus
clauses . Kim's requirement that an adequate explanation of an event cite
sufficient conditions for that event is unnecessarily stringent. Too many good
explanations fail to cite causally sufficient conditions. 17 In fact, it is not clear that
any explanation anyone has ever given has cited such conditions.
Let us now turn to the question of what Kim means by an independent
explanation. Suppose we are trying to explain an explanandum E, which states
that an event e occurred, and we have two claims, Ci and C2, which purport to
pick out two causes for e's occurrence, ci and C2. Kim claims that there are only
six possible ways that we can explain the relationship between ci and C2.
1) It could turn out that ci=C2, and that Ci and C2 are just different
names for the same objective cause of e.
2) It could turn out that one is reducible to, or supervenient on, the
other.
3) ci and C2 might be only partial causes of e.
4) ci and C2 might be different links in the same causal chain leading to
event e.
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5) One might be part of the other.
6) ci and C2 might each be sufficient for e, and e over-determined.
Remember that for explanations to conflict, according to Kim, each would have
to be both complete and independent. Only the possibility represented by (6),
then, poses a real threat to EE. (3) does not threaten EE, as neither Ci nor C2 is a
complete explanation as to why E occurred (as neither ci nor C2 would be
sufficient by themselves to make e happen). (1), (2), (4), and (5) also fail to
threaten EE, as they represent cases in which ci and c2 are not independent of
one another. Only (6), then, represents a possibility in which there are two
complete and independent explanations of the same event. But are
nonreductive physicalists advocating that mental and physical causal
explanations fit the pattern that (6) represents?
Usually when we say that an event e is over-determined we are speaking
of redundant causation — in which there are two numerically distinct conditions
for e's occurrence, each of which would have caused e even if the other one had
been absent. 18 Consider this classic example of redundant causation: An
assassin pulls the trigger, the bullet rips through the air, and a man falls down
dead. Suppose that at the very same moment another assassin, causally
unrelated to the first, also fires her gun at the man. Suppose, further, that each
of these bullets reach the man's heart simultaneously. Here we have a case in
which it is natural to say that the man's death is causally over-determined. Here
we do have two complete and independent causal processes. Each of the bullets
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would have killed him even if the other one had been absent. But those who
argue that an event may have both mental and physical causal explanations are
not arguing that each explanation cites two such complete and independent
causal processes. Rather, they believe that there is a more intimate relationship
between the mental and physical cause. As Jonathan Schaffer puts it "the
overdetermining parts are lawfully yoked."™ They believe that the physical cause
(along with the appropriate background conditions) is sufficient for the mental
cause. Kim's prohibition against competing explanations, then, does not rule
out the types of competing causal-explanations that Owens, Lewis, and
nonreductive physicalists are advocating
.
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Second Challenge: The Argument from Physical Composition
A different kind of challenge to nonreductive physicalism has emerged
in recent years. This challenge argues that anyone who believes that the mental
is realized in, composed out of, or constituted by the physical is committed to
claims that, "closely conform to the spirit of reductionism ." 21 Here is how the
argument usually proceeds. Suppose that mental kind-properties are multiply
realized in physical properties. Their being so realized means that, in principle,
we will have some physical explanation for each instantiation of a mental kind
and each implementation of a mental law. The existence of any physical
explanation of mental kinds/ laws would, so the challenger claims, count as a
reductive explanation. Furthermore, the challenger continues, if we can
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theoretically provide this type of 'reductive' explanation for every instance of a
mental kind/ law, then we will have established psychophysical reductionism.
As Casey O Callaghan asserts, "If we have explained each 'implementation' of
the psychological law in terms of the physical, then we've succeeded in
reducing it." 22
As Andrew Melnyk is perhaps the most vocal advocate of this challenge,
let me spend some time on an argument he presents in a still unpublished
monograph. 23 Melnyk also presents a similar argument in his published 1995
article, "Two Cheers for Reductionism; Or, The Dim Prospects for Non-
Reductive Materialism," but the arguments in that paper are even harder to
untangle. In the monograph, Melnyk begins by pointing out that both the
classic accounts of reduction (e.g., Ernest Nagel's account), and contemporary
scientific accounts of reduction (e.g., those by Steven Weinberg, Murry Gell-
Mann, and Francis Crick) assume that reduction is a type of explanation.24 Most
nonreductive physicalists would accept this assumption. However,
nonreductive physicalists would not accept the further assumption being made
here— that just any explanation of the mental in physical terms counts as a
reductive explanation. Melnyk then argues that a commitment to something he
calls realization physicalism (the claim that all higher-level properties are
functional properties realized by physical properties) commits one to the
following reductionist thesis:
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(CR) All nomic special- and honorary scientific facts, and all positive
non-nomic special and honorary scientific facts, have an
explanation that appeals only to (i) physical facts and (ii)
necessary (i.e., entirely non-contingent) truths.
Melnyk explains that by 'special- and honorary-scientific facts/ he means facts
expressible in the proprietary vocabularies of the special and honorary sciences;
and that by 'nomic special- and honorary-scientific facts/ he means the holding
of such counterfactually-supporting regularities as can be expressed by
generalizations couched in the proprietary vocabularies of the special and
honorary sciences
.
25 Realization physicalism is committed to CR, Melnyk
argues, because it allows for the derivability of: (i) every proposition asserting
the existence of one of the special-and honorary scientific tokens that actually
exist; and (ii), in the case of each regularity holding among special- and
honorary-scientific tokens, every proposition asserting the holding of an
instance of this regularity . 26
Here is an example of the type of physical explanation Melnyk claims
exists, given the truth of realization physicalism. Suppose there is a can opener
on the table, and someone asks why there is a can opener there. Melnyk argues
that it is open to the realization physicalist to offer the following physical
explanation of the can-opener:
Well, there is a swarm of physical particles there which plays the
can-opener role, and all it takes for there to be a can-opener there
is that something there should play the can-opener role . 27
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Melnyk admits that such an explanation is unlikely to satisfy all our explanatory
needs. For example, it would be a very unsatisfactory answer to the question of
how the can opener got from the drawer to the table. Nevertheless, he insists,
we would still have a perfectly good physical explanation of the can-opener. It
is a perfectly good explanation of the can-opener because it allows us to predict
that a can-opener is on the table, and it is a physical explanation because it is
couched primarily in physical language. (Of course, it is not couched entirely in
physical language, as can-opener role is not a term from physics.)
However, Melnyk's argument that realization physicalism entails what
he calls reduction in the "core sense" is not entirely convincing. Both in the
earlier published paper, and in this unpublished manuscript, Melnyk
repeatedly claims that physicalism entails reductionism because we are able to
derive a statement claiming that the special-scientific particular (or instance of a
regularity) exists from statements couched in the language of physics, or that we
are able to predict that the special-scientific particular (or instance of a
regularity) exists from the physical facts. In other words, Melnyk believes that: i)
derivability/ predictability is sufficient for reducibility in some core sense, and ii)
the derivation/ prediction that a particular (or instance of a regularity) exists is a
reductive physical explanation. Both assumptions are worth arguing against.
Responding to Melnyk's first assumption is relatively simple— we have only to
remember that (as I discussed in Chapter Three) no contemporary philosopher
of science believes that derivability, and its converse predictability, is sufficient
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for reduction. Remember that anyone who rejects the deductive-nomological
account of explanation would not believe that deduction/ prediction is
sufficient for explanation, and that even contemporary deductivists do not
believe that deduction/ prediction is sufficient for reduction (though they think
it necessary). In what core sense, then, has Melnyk reduced special- and
honorary-scientific tokens/ laws simply because we are able to derive/ predict
the existence of the special- and honorary-scientific particulars/ laws from
statements couched in physical language?
Responding to Melnyk's second assumption is slightly trickier. In order
to establish a type of reductionism that threatens nonreductive physicalism
Melnyk needs to show that merely predicting the existence of a special- or
honorary scientific token from the physical facts is the type of reductive
'explanation' that nonreductive physicalists consider to be impossible.
However, as I argued in Chapter Two, this is not the claim that nonreductive
physicalists are making. Rather, nonreductive physicalists claim that the
special-sciences have a unique explanatory role that cannot be replaced by
physics, even in theory. It is not the existence of special-scientific particulars that
cannot be explained, according to nonreductive physicalists, it is their causal
powers that cannot be explained.
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A General Argument?
But perhaps there is a more general argument against nonreductive
physicalism to be made here. Although Melnyk speaks of a relationship of
realization, rather than a relationship of composition or constitution, nothing
substantial seems to hang on this particular metaphysical commitment. For
Melnyk, the claim that special-scientific kinds are realized in the physical is just
the claim that, "Everything of a kind that is not mentioned as such in
fundamental physics is purely physical in the same sense in which the can-
opener is purely physical ."28 Later Melnyk claims that the physical realizer of
something like a can-opener is 'the swarm of physical particles' playing the
can-opener role .' 24 In other words, Melnyk's realization relationship seems
more like a relationship of composition or constitution than of realization. It is
certainly not Kim's realization relationship, in which the realizer of a special-
scientific property is a single physical property. Given that Melnyk's argument
does not depend on Kim's controversial interpretation of the realization
relationship, I think we can present his argument more perspicuously as the
claim that physicalism in general (not just realization physicalism ) entails a type
of reductionism. If physicalism is committed to reductionism, then there would
certainly be something incoherent or self-contradictory about the nonreductive
physicalist position.
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Here is a general argument that I think captures the claim that a
commitment to physicalism automatically commits one to reductionism in
some core sense. Note that because we are primarily interested in psycho-
physical reductionism, I have phrased this argument in terms of the reducibility
of the mental.
The Argument from Physical Composition
PI. All actual particulars in space and/or time (objects, events, and
processes) are either fundamental physical particulars, or are
exhaustively composed out of fundamental physical particulars.
P2. If (1), then there is an explanation of any actual particular object, event, or
process solely in terms of its fundamental physical properties.
LI- Therefore, there is an explanation of any actual particular object, event, or
process solely in terms of its fundamental physical properties
P3. If (LI), then there is an explanation of each implementation of mental
laws and regularities solely in terms of its fundamental physical
properties.
L2. Therefore, there is an explanation of each implementation of mental laws
and regularities solely in terms of its fundamental physical properties.
P4. If (LI) and (L2), then the mental is (in some core sense) reducible to the
physical.
C. Therefore, he mental is (in some core sense) reducible to the physical.
Before commenting on the above argument, I would first like to explain each of
its premises separately. (PI) shoulci be familiar to the reader, as it is just (OC)
from the first chapter (OC is the basic ontological commitment to which I
claimed all physicalists should be committed). (P2) trades on the term
'explanation'. (P2) holds that any time we have a special-scientific particular,
constituted by physical particulars, we have some explanation of this particular
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in physical terms. This will not, of course, be a causal explanation telling us
how or why that special-scientific particular came into being. Rather, it will be
the type of explanation that Pereboom and Kornblith call a constitutional
explanation, and Robert Cummings calls an explanation by analysis
.
30 (LI), a
lemma, is true if (PI) and (P2) are true. P(3) makes essentially the same claim as
(P2). Each time there is an instance of a special-scientific law, e.g., a causal law,
there will be some description of that law's instance in physical terms. For
example, we might have the following explanation as to why a can opener opens
a can: when a swarm of particles playing a can-opener role comes into contact
with a swarm of particles playing a can role, and when these two swarms
interact in such-and-such a way, the can opens. (L2), another lemma, is true if
(LI) and (P3) are true. (P4), however, is the key to this argument. (P4) claims
that all the reductive physicalist needs to do, to establish reductionism in some
core sense, is to prove that we have the above-mentioned types of explanations.
What both Melnyk's argument and the argument from constitution are
claiming, then, is that the existence of any sort of physical explanation of the
mental threatens the epistemological claim allegedly made by nonreductive
physicalists that there can be no physical explanation for mental phenomenon. 31
Of course, I do not think that non-reductive physicalists are making such
an implausible claim. Remember that non-reductive physicalists are
physicalists. Principles of charity require that we not foist on them any position
that so easily conflicts with their commitment to physical ism. Rather than insist
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that there can be no physical explanation of a particular or instance of a law,
non-reductive physicalists argue that it is unlikely that there will be a physical
explanation capable of replacing special-scientific explanations, or of capturing
what special-scientific explanations capture. The mere fact that an object, event,
or process is constituted by physical stuff ensures that there will be some
explanation of that object, event, or process in physical terms, but it does not
ensure that there will be an edifying explanation. As Hilary Putnam pointed
out early on:
Very often we are told that if something is made of matter, its behavior
must have a physical explanation. And the argument is that if it is made
of matter (and we make a lot of assumptions), then there should be a
deduction of its behavior from its material structure. What makes you call
this deduction an explanation ?32
In this article, Putnam (one of the early advocates of nonreductive physicalism)
argues that only 'explanations' that meet our explanatory needs are candidates
for reductive explanations. As not every deduction meets our explanatory
needs, not every deduction counts as an explanation.
In his third chapter, Melnyk considers and dismisses the possibility that
all the anti-reductionist is claiming is that any physical explanation we have of
special-scientific facts will be so convoluted that it would fail to be explanatory
Indeed, it is possible that all that certain physicalist anti-
reductionists have ever wanted to insist on is that, given multiple
realization, special-or honorary-scientific regularities will turn out
to have only highly disunited explanations in physical terms; and
if their point has really been so modest, then I happily concede it.
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But it obviously does not entail the falsity of reductionism in the
core sense. For even if a unified explanation is better, ceteris
paribus, than a disunified one, a disunifed explanation is still an
explanation; and reductionism in the core sense only requires that
special-and honorary-scientific regularities should have an
explanation that appeals to only physical facts plus necessary
truths.
But that is exactly what nonreductive physicalists have traditionally argued!
Remember Putnam's peg and board example, from "Reductionism and the
Nature of Psychology ." 33 There Putnam argues that any detailed microphysical
explanation of the peg and board would not be able to capture the high-level-
abstract geometrical explanation that square pegs do not in general pass though
round holes of approximately the same size. And remember Fodor's claim, in
"Special Sciences," that the special-scientific explanations cannot be replaced by
physical explanations because, "Not all the classes of things and events about
which there are important, counterfactual supporting generalizations to make
are, or correspond to, physical kinds." 34 Remember too that for Fodor
explanations consisting of open-ended disjunctions of physical kinds are not
explanatory primarily because they do not meet our interest in explanation
.
35
Third Challenge: Mysterious Connections
Like the second challenge, the third challenge also rests on the
assumption that reductions are types of explanations. Advocates of this
challenge begin by pointing out that any physicalist who holds that the physical
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facts determine all other facts is committed to there being necessary connections
between every non-physical property and physical properties. The challenger
then urges us to agree with him/her that such connections cry out for
explanations. Finally, the challenger insists that we will find such explanations
only if reductionism is true. Here is how David Papineau presents the
challenge:
My difficulty with this picture [Fodor's picture of the relation between
special sciences and physics] is this. If the different Ps have nothing
physically in common, as required by the non-reducibility of SI, then
how come they all give rise to Qs which do have something in common,
namely that they are all realizations of S2? Why should such
heterogeneous Ps always yield Qs with this homogeneous feature?36
Papineau argues that Fodor's picture is incredible, as it commits us to the
existence of certain patterns, but denies that these patterns can be accounted for
uniformly in terms of physical laws. It would seems far too mysterious if our
world just happens to contain a bunch of brute modal facts like the following:
Necessarily, for any x if x has P, then x has M; and, necessarily, for any x if x has
P', then x has M. Ralph Wedgwood agrees. Invoking the oft used fictional
example in which C-fiber firing is responsible for pains, Wedgwood writes,
"The fact that pain is necessitated by C-fiber-firing in particular (rather than,
say, by Z-fiber-firing) surely cries out for further explanation."37 Both Papineau
and Wedgwood argue that if reductive physicalism were true would we be able
to explain these erstwhile brute modal facts.
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Let us adopt Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons's language in calling
the above types of property connections "specific supervenience facts." 38 Note
that the challenger is not necessarily arguing for reductionism a priori. His point
is rather that reductionism has to be true empirically, as it is just too
unbelievable to imagine that there are no reductive explanations of specific-
supervenience facts. Here is what I see to be the general argument behind this
challenge. Let P and P represent physical properties, and S some special-
scientific property.
Argument from Mysterious Connections
1) All physicalists are committed to there being specific-supervenience
facts.
2) Nonreductive physicalists believe that specific-supervenience facts
cannot be explained by physics.
3) If specific-supervenience facts cannot be explained by physics, then
such connections are brute, mysterious, and inexplicable.
4) Therefore, given (1), (2), and (3), nonreductive physicalists are
committed to the existence of specific-supervenience facts that are
brute, mysterious, and inexplicable.
5) If reductive physicalism were true, we could explain these specific-
supervenience facts.
6) It is more likely that we will be able to explain specific-supervenience
facts than that we will be unable to explain specific-supervenience
facts.
7) Therefore, given (4), (5) and (6), reductive physicalism is likely true.
And here is how I think nonreductive physicalists would respond to this
challenge. Nonreductive physicalists would probably accept (1) and (2), but
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deny (3). Just because the connection cannot be explained from the bottom-up
(from the perspective of physics) does not mean that it is inexplicable. It can be
explained. In fact, it is explained! The special-sciences set the individuation
conditions for the instantiation of their properties and laws. It is from the
special-sciences that we learn what is needed for something e.g., to be a mind.
Physics is involved only because it is able to explain why certain physical
conditions can, and others cannot, meet these conditions. If it is impossible to
make a mind from a gaseous substances, this is because psychology has (or
will) specify the conditions under which a mind is present, and it is physically
impossible for gaseous substances to meet these conditions.39 The connections
are not brute, mysterious, or inexplicable simpliciter. They may be so from the
perspective of physics, but they are not so from the perspective of the special
science.
Both Papineau and Wedgwood argue that the only way that specific
supervenience facts can avoid being brute, mysterious, and inexplicable is if
they are functionally realized. We explain how something has M by pointing
out that it has M just in case it has “the complex physical property of having
some physical property that meets one of these physical conditions." If e.g.,
mental properties are functionally realized then,
It is a fundamental necessary truth about each mental property that it is
equivalent to the "functional property" of having some physical
property that plays a certain causal role (where this causal role can be
specified in completely physical or topic-neutral terms); and, at least in
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the broad sense of the term that I am using here, this functional property
counts as a "physical property" A non-reductive conception of mental
properties would deny that mental properties are physically reducible in
this sense
.
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Both Papineau and Wedgwood claim that this functional explanation is a
physical explanation. Perhaps, but it is not a physical explanation that replaces
the higher-level explanation. The higher-level explanation is still needed to
explain why these particular physical circumstances realize this mental
property. The real complaint being made by the reductive physicalists seems to
be that they are unable to appreciate how the special-sciences have any
explanatory role to play. But they do have an explanatory role to play. The fact
that they do is not something philosophers have control over.
Conclusion
In Chapter Four I considered three additional challenges to nonreductive
physicalism. All the challenges assume that reductions are types of non-causal,
synchronic explanations. The first challenge argues that the only way to explain
mental causation is to accept reductionism. Undergirding this challenge is the
assumption that physical explanations will always crowd out any rival
explanation. While I could not possibly cover all the permutations of the
argument from causation against mental realism , I hope to have at least sowed
some seeds of doubt regarding whether the argument is sound. I argued that
the soundness of this argument ultimately rests on the soundness of Kim's
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explanatory exclusion argument, and that the explanatory exclusion argument
is not entirely convincing. I also discussed two recent challenges to
nonreductive physicalism-the argument from physical composition for
epistemological reduction and the argument from mysterious connections. For
the second challenge, I argued that the type of 'explanation' that this challenge
establishes does not threaten any actual nonreductive physicalist positions. The
second challenge relies on interpreting nonreductive physicalism uncharitably
as claiming that there can be no possible physical explanation of special-
scientific particulars or instances of special-scientific laws. I hope I have
succeeded in convincing my reader this is not the non-reductive physicalists'
claim. For the third challenge, I argued that reductive physicalists are wrong to
claim that nonreductive physicalists are committed to the existence of brute,
mysterious, and inexplicably connections between properties. The argument
that they are reflects a unjustified bias in favor of lower-level physical
explanations over upper-level special-scientific (including psychological)
explanations. Thus this argument does not succeed in attacking nonreductive
physicalism directly, but instead merely reflects the ideological divide that
already exists between reductive and nonreductive physicalists.
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APPENDIX
QUOTES ABOUT REDUCTIONISM
To show how truly divergent the uses are to which the terms reduction and
t eductionism have been put by philosophers, here is a small sample of what has been
said about reductionism over the past fifty years:
Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956)
Scientific progress may broadly be divided into two types: (1) an increase
in factual knowledge, by the addition to the total amount of scientific
observations; (2) an improvement in the body of theories, which is
designed to explain the known facts and to predict the outcome of future
observations. An especially important case of the second type is the
replacement of an accepted theory (or body of theories) by a new theory
(or body of theories) which is in some sense superior to it. Reduction is
an improvement in this sense. 1
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958)
If Bi [a branch of science] reduces B2 [another branch of science], it
explains everything that B2 does (and normally, more besides). Then,
even if cannot define in Bi analogues for some of the theoretical terms of
B2, we can use Bi in place of B2. Thus any reduction, in the sense
explained, permits a "reduction" of the total vocabulary of science by
making it possible to dispense with some terms. 2
Ernest Nagel (1961)
Reduction, in the sense in which the word is here employed, is the
explanation of a theory or a set of experimental laws established in one
area of inquiry, by a theory usually though not invariably formulated for
some other domain.3
Kenneth Schaffner (1967)
Intertheoretic explanation in which one theory is explained by another,
usually formulated for a different domain, is generally terms theory
reduction .4
Hilary Putnam (1973)
Reductionism asserts that psychology is deducible from the functional
organization of the brain.5
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Jerry Fodor (1974)
Reductionism is the conjunction of token physicalism with the
assumption that there are natural kind predicates in an ideally
completed physics which correspond to each natural kind predicate in
any ideally completed special science
.
6
If psychology is reducible to neurology, then for every psychological
kind predicate there is a coextensive neurological kind predicate, and the
generalization which states this coextension is a law .7
Heilman and Thompson (1975)
[Reductionism is the view that] all scientific terms can be given explicit
definitions in physical terms
.
8
Paul Churchland (1979)
As even causal scrutiny will reveal, the reduction of one theory to
another bears certain substantial similarities to the translation of one
language to another. In both cases we find a mapping of one vocabulary
into another, a mapping that preserves certain features thought to be
important—In sum, what a successful reduction shows us is that one
way of conceiving things can be safely, smoothly, and - if the excess
empirical content of Tn [reducing theory] over Sn [an equipotent image
of the reduced theory within the idiom of the reducing theory] is
corroborated
- profitably displaced by another way of conceiving things
.
9
Richard Boyd (1980)
The reductive analysis of materialism asserts] the syntactic reducibility of
the vocabulary and laws of all the sciences to the vocabulary and laws of
physics... [also] the definability of all mental psychological states (or, on
some accounts, all token mental and psychological states) in the
vocabulary of physics .10
Alan Garfinkel (1981)
The reducibility of psychology to physics and chemistry amounts to the
claim that conduct can be explained wholly in terms of physical and
chemical phenomena....So reduction, which is on its face an ontological
question, is really a question about the possibility of explanation: to say
that something is reducible to something else is to say that certain kinds
of explanations exist....One realm of discourse is reducible to another if
the reduction theory gives us all the explanatory power of the theory
being reduced . 11
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C. A. Hooker (1981)
I shall take as the aims of reduction ontological and explanatory
unification. Under appropriate circumstances (but not universally)
satisfying these requirements will also yield conceptual economy and/or
increased systematicity-with-simplicity
.
12
Robert Cummins (1983)
It is important to distinguish the claim that a theory identifies
instantiations from the claim that it licenses reductions. As I use the
term, reduction requires that the true statements one can make about a
domain in a vocabulary v can all be formulated in a different reducing
vocabulary v\ It is now commonplace (I hope) that one can hold that
everything is physical -has some physical description- without holding
that everything worth saying in science can be said in the language of
physics . 13
John Post (1987)
Physical reduction... occurs when terms from another domain are
defined solely by terms from physics. The strongest variety requires that
the two terms— one nonphysical, the other from physics— be fully
synonymous, or at least "translatable" one into the other without
significant loss of meaning. The weakest requires only that they be
coextensive. Somewhere between is a coextensiveness that is not
accidental but entailed by the laws of science, hence a lawlike
coextensiveness .14
[Nonreductionism is the view that ] not everything real can be brought
under some physical or other objective description, and physically
irreducible talk is far from automatically false or meaningless . 15
David Owens (1989)
According to the reductionist, there is nothing of explanatory
importance, no laws or nomologically interesting classifications of events
which cannot be formulated in the language of physics. To put it another
way, someone who knows all the laws of physics and all the physical
facts can explain and predict anything that the economist can explain or
predict . 16
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Jaegwon Kim (1989-90)
Reduction of one theory to another requires the derivation of the laws of
the reduced theory from those of the reducer, and for this to be possible,
terms of the first theory must be appropriately connected, via 'bridge
principles
,
with those of the second. And bridge principles must be
either conceptually under-written as definitions, or else express
empirical lawlike correlations ('bridge laws' or 'theoretical identities'). 17
When reduction is at issue, we are talking about theories, theories
couched in their distinctive theoretical vocabularies
.
18
Patricia and Paul Churchland (1990)
Intertheoretic reduction is at bottom a relation between two distinct
conceptual frameworks for describing the phenomena. The whole point
of reduction is to show that what we thought to be two domains is
actually one domain, though they may have been described in two (or
more) different vocabularies
.
19
Steven Weinberg (1994)
[Reduction is] the perception that scientific principles are the way they
are because of deeper scientific principles (and, in some cases, historical
accidents) and that all these principles can be traced to one simple
connected set of laws
.
20
Francis Crick (1994)
[Reduction is] the ideal that it is possible, at least in principle, to explain
a phenomenon in terms of less complicated constituents . 21
Terence Horgan (1996)
A very plausible-looking condition on genuine reduction is that each
higher-order causal/ explanatory property be nomically coextensive not
just with any old lower-order property, but with some lower-order
causal/explanatory property. For, if this condition is not met, then the
higher-order causal/ explanatory properties will cross-classify the lower-
order ones, and thus will figure in higher-order causal/ explanatory
generalizations that are not directly mirrored at the lower theoretical
level .22
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David Chalmers (1996)
A natural phenomenon is reductively explainable in terms of some
lower-level properties if the property of instantiating that phenomenon
is globally logically supervenient on the low-level properties in question.
A phenomenon is reductively explainable simpliciter if the property of
instantiating that phenomenon is globally logically supervenient on
physical properties
.
23
Harold Kincaid (1997)
One theory reduces to another when it can do all the explanatory work
of the reduced theory.... If there were good reasons to think that
molecular biology and statistical mechanics could not do all the
explanatory work of their higher-level counterparts (and there is), then
whatever they have achieved, it is not reduction. To claim reduction
while admitting explanatory incompleteness is to make the issue a trivial
semantic one. It is not . 24
Jaegwon Kim (1998)
To reduce a property, or phenomenon, we first construe it— or
reconstrue it— functionally, in terms of its causal/nomic relations to
other properties and phenomena.... We then find properties or
mechanisms, often at the microlevel, that satisfy these causal/ nomic
specifications and thereby fill the specified causal roles....Reductions
therefore are doubly relative: in systems with different structures, the
underlying mechanisms realizing the reduced property may vary, and
reductions remain valid only when the basic laws of nature are held
constant— that is, only for nomologically possible worlds (relative to the
reference world .25
Daniel Steel (2003)
I propose that reduction is an explanatory strategy that can be pursued
in order to achieve a variety of different goals, and what form the
reduction should take depends on its purpose .26
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